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Abstract 
 
Decentralization has been an integral part of the political reform process in former socialist 
countries throughout Central and Eastern Europe.  The rationale behind decentralizing 
government services and responsibilities to the local units of government is that they are closer 
to the clientele they serve and, therefore, can better understand their needs to respond more 
efficiently and effectively.  Since gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, the Republic 
of Macedonia has instituted a number of legislative changes that transferred a significant number 
of competencies from the central government to the municipalities.  This study examines the 
decentralization process in the Republic of Macedonia and assesses whether the decentralization 
process has created local units of government that are more efficient, effective, and accountable.  
The study looks at the interaction between the central government and the municipalities to 
investigate the degree to which the proper competencies have or have not been transferred to the 
lower level of government. 
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Introduction to the Research 
 
The end of communist regimes in Eastern Europe around 1990 was a monumental event in world 
history that brought instantaneous changes to the world order and ended one of the largest social 
and political experiments in human history.  Because of the orientation of the political, societal, 
and economic institutions with Marxist-Leninist communism, these states had missed out on the 
development that the West had experienced.  Since the end of this era, East European countries 
have had to change in order to fit into the world and its economy in a very short time.  The 
pressure was brought to bear on the citizens and political institutions of these countries, which 
had to adapt to a notion of democracy, market economy structures, and a societal organization 
that is diametrically opposed to the old order of their governments and societies (Vujacic 2002, 
36).  Democratization and privatization have been two major themes in the transition and 
development of these countries from socialist states to modern states.  Decentralization and the 
development and reform of local governments are fundamental elements in the transition of East 
European countries to such a democratic and capitalistic society.  In policy terms, 
decentralization means citizens are directly able through local elections and other forms of 
public participation to influence decisions that directly affect their lives and their environment.  
In management terms, this means that for sectors formerly managed at the central level, decision 
taking is transferred to the local level together with adequate resources - financial, human, and 
technical (Channel Research 2004, 2).  Further cementing the development of meaningful local 
democratic institutions is the demand that governments be open and transparent, and that they 
also be accountable to the citizens.  Decentralizing power from the central government to the 
local governments is a key piece of the puzzle in encouraging free and democratic societies in 
the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  4
 
Decentralization in Macedonia has meant a dramatic transfer of competencies from the central 
government to the municipalities in the last seventeen years.  More often than not, however, this 
has been manifested in the laws and directives that have mandated various responsibilities and 
competencies be transferred, but have left the municipalities without the necessary financial 
authority to effectively execute them.  While assigning new responsibilities to the municipalities 
is a significant, if not symbolic, step towards decentralization, for the system to be effective and 
efficient the municipalities must also be granted the resources and capacity to handle the new 
responsibilities.      
 
This study examines the decentralization process in the Republic of Macedonia in the context of 
the transition of former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  It narrowly 
investigates how the decentralization process in Macedonia has affected the local units of 
government, municipalities.  The study also looks at the interaction between the central 
government and the municipalities, and the degree to which the proper competencies have or 
have not been transferred to the lower level of government. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
 
Introduction 
The Republic of Macedonia is a country of approximately two million people situated in the 
Western Balkans in southeastern Europe.  It is a small, landlocked country that shares its borders 
with Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania.  Macedonia was one of six Yugoslav republics from 
1945 to 1991, when it gained independence from Yugoslavia, which was in the midst of violent 
secessionist wars in Croatia and Bosnia at that time.  Unlike those two republics, Macedonia’s 
independence came peacefully. However, the country faced severe hardship due to the weak 
economy it inherited and numerous trade embargoes with its neighbors.  Macedonia spent the 
decade after independence struggling to revive its economy and foster sound democratic 
principles in a relatively short amount of time.  The political and economic gains the country 
achieved were nearly derailed with the Kosovo crisis in 1999, which led to a spillover conflict in 
Macedonia in 2001 between ethnic Albanian separatists and the Macedonian military.  With the 
assistance of the international community, a broader conflict was averted with the drafting of the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement in August of 2001.  This agreement ended fighting and provided 
political and institutional solutions to ease the tension between the two groups.  Among the 
changes that resulted from the Ohrid Framework Agreement were numerous political reforms 
that furthered Macedonia’s process of Euro-Atlantic integration.  In 2006, Macedonia was 
awarded for its reform efforts and became an official European Union candidate country.  
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Macedonia is currently seeking to gain membership into NATO, which is seen as a step to 
further stabilize this volatile region.       
 
                   Figure 1.1  Map of the Balkans 
                     
         Source:  Environmental Health perspectives Online, retrieved from www.ehponline.org 
Rationale and Need for the Study 
As stated above, decentralization has been an integral part of the reform process in former 
socialist countries throughout Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe.  The position of 
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decentralization as a key part of political reforms is not merely limited to former socialist 
countries, but is also a principal approach in revamping governments throughout the developing 
world and making them more responsible and accountable.  Developing countries are far more 
centralized than more developed ones, and because of the level of underdevelopment of the 
economy and country, the delivery of public goods and services is extraordinarily low and fails 
to meet the needs of the citizens.  As such, there has been a strong push to decentralize many 
government services and responsibilities to lower levels of government in order to more 
adequately address the needs of the people.  The basic idea behind decentralization is that local 
units of government are closer to the clientele they serve, and therefore better understand their 
needs and are in a position to respond more efficiently and effectively.  Nearly all developing 
countries have experimented or are experimenting with decentralization in one form or another.  
Decentralization is likely to remain on the agenda of developing and transition countries as they 
continue to search for the optimal balance of centralized and decentralized powers and 
responsibilities of government that best fits the political, social, and economic situation of each 
country, resulting in a process that is ongoing and continually evolving. 
 
Macedonia has been in the transformation process for more than sixteen years.  Since the 
beginning of the decentralization process that started with achieving independence from 
Yugoslavia in 1991, many steps have been taken that have brought the country closer to its goal 
of building a more mature and developed democracy.  However, that goal has yet to be fully 
realized.  This is particularly important in light of the country’s aspiration of becoming a member 
state of the European Union, with admittance hinging on the development of more effective, 
responsive, and accountable local government.  Therefore, it is imperative that Macedonia take 
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the necessary steps to complete the decentralization process, but to temper that drive with 
consideration to ensure that each municipality has the capacity to handle the newly transferred 
competencies.  Rushing the decentralization process and devolving powers to local units of 
governments that lack the resources and capacity that would enable them to properly manage 
each new competency can result in a system that is just as ineffective, if not more so, than the 
previously centralized system of government.     
 
Statement of the Problem 
The study explored the following:   Have the relevant local government responsibilities been 
transferred from the central government to the local municipalities and, if so, how effective has 
this process been in terms of achieving the stated goals to create local governments that are more 
effective, efficient, and accountable? 
 
Research Questions to be Investigated 
To satisfactorily investigate the above research problem, the following questions are necessary to 
answer: 
 What is the legal framework that regulates the transfer of planning responsibilities from 
the central government to the local municipalities? 
 How does the current arrangement differ from the previous one? 
 Do the municipalities have the capacity, which is the essential quality and quantity of 
local officials, knowledge, technology, and revenue, to handle the new responsibilities? 
 What is being done to ensure that the municipalities have the capacity to adequately 
handle the new responsibilities? 
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 Does resistance exist on the part of central government and ministry officials that will 
hinder the progress of decentralization? 
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Chapter 2 
History and Background
 
Macedonia is an interesting case in regard to decentralization.  Long before the Republic of 
Macedonia gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, Macedonia, as well as the other five 
republics, had a considerable amount of autonomy, especially compared to most of the other 
socialist federations.  Decentralization was a part of the style of government long before each 
gained independence, and was ahead of the international community’s efforts to democratize the 
East European countries in the 1990’s (Kolodko 2000, 56).  Macedonia has a long tradition of 
self-administration, and its local communities possess a strong culture of self-help (Channel 
Research 2004, 3).  Relatively speaking, Macedonia had a considerable amount of power 
devolved to the local governments.  Despite a brief period of centralization shortly after 
independence, Macedonia has been able to make considerable progress in this area as part of its 
transition to a more democratic and open society.   
History of Decentralization in Yugoslavia 
In understanding decentralization in Macedonia, it is important to trace the evolution of the 
governmental organization of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, hereon out referred 
to as Yugoslavia.  
 
By the early 1990’s, Yugoslavia, like the other Eastern European federations, had broken up into 
numerous republics.  There are numerous reasons why this happened, but the following are 
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considered to be the most important.  The ethnic and religious differences that had been quelled 
for so long evolved into a sense of separate identities and ultimately into multiple nationalisms 
within Yugoslavia.  The difficult economic situation and high unemployment fueled resentment 
among the ethnic groups, as well as resentment toward the central government.  These economic 
difficulties also led to resentment among the regions, namely between the North (Croatia and 
Slovenia) and the South (Macedonia, Kosovo, and Montenegro).  This was rooted in the fact that 
resources were being redistributed from the richer republics, Croatia and Slovenia, to the poorer 
ones, Macedonia and Montenegro.  Present at this time was a political stalemate at the federal 
level that prevented the central government from functioning effectively and eventually led to 
the dissolution of the federal system (Trogen 2001, 331).   
 
Ironically, underlying all these issues was one of the very ideas that was used to bring them 
together, and that was the right to self-determination.  In essence Yugoslavia was a fairly 
awkward union of several different ethnic groups who were not necessarily united in a common 
cause other than that of the communist totalitarian project and federalist state that Josep Broz 
Tito envisioned based on the Soviet model (Vujacic 2002, 37).  As a means of pacifying the 
various groups and ensuring that they were supportive of the state, he allowed the groups to 
retain their cultural identities and languages.  The most significant way in which he maintained 
their allegiance was by giving them a considerable amount of autonomy and self-governance.  Of 
course the policy-making was ultimately left to Belgrade, but the implementation and 
administration of policies was left to the individual republics, which then could make limited 
decisions.  In this way, Macedonia had experience with self-governance, which has helped to 
make the decentralization process a more natural progression.           
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Yugoslavia’s development after the Second World War was marked by successive periods in 
which central party and government controls were reasserted so as to fulfill perceived social 
responsibilities, including citizen participation and decentralization of decisions in local 
communities.  This process of change has involved substantial conflict between federal authority, 
republic and local bodies.  Relationships between centralization and decentralization have been 
complex, adaptive, and conflicting (Dunn 1975, 131). 
The Stalinist Phase (1945-1950) 
 
Immediately following the end of WWII, the political and economic policy represented an effort 
by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) to develop the economy based on the 
methods employed by the Soviet Union after 1929.  This model had two fundamental priorities, 
one that was political and one economic.  The political priority was concerned with the 
integration of political and economic decision-making powers at the highest level of the 
Communist Party.  This was done to enable the federal government to prescribe the overall goals 
of Yugoslavia’s economic planning in general and to develop production targets for each sector 
of the economy.  The economic priority was based on the model Stalin used, which assigned the 
highest priority to the development of capital goods industries, e.g., iron and steel, building 
materials, and energy sources (Lang, 1975, 312).  This is exactly the model that Yugoslavia 
implemented in the immediate postwar years.  
 
The first Five-Year Plan (1947-1951) set out to increase the development of capital goods 
industries and transportation networks.  Special emphasis was placed on the expansion of 
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agricultural production to feed the growing urban population, which entailed collectivization of 
farms.  In order to control planning decisions, the Party also created a new federal structure of 
government (Lang 1975, 313).  It created territorial entities based upon nationality, established 
constitutional guarantees for the representation of each major nationality at the federal level, and 
guaranteed the cultural autonomy of each national group (Lang 1975, 313).  This effectively 
established a precedent for devolution of power to sub-state entities identified specifically by 
nationality.  From the very beginning, this system was faced with the challenge of an economy 
that was characterized by acute disparities in regional economic development.  Although there 
were underdeveloped areas relative to others within each republic, the most glaring inequalities 
were between the republican boundaries.  Slovenia and Croatia had far higher per capita incomes 
than the Serbian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, and Kosovo populations.  The Party immediately 
set out to reduce these disparities.  Equality was to be achieved through “utilization of 
accumulation by the State in general and its redistribution” (Lang 1975, 314). 
 
There were three major issues with this approach to economic planning.  The first was that the 
centrally planned economy was conducive to highly uneconomic allocations of resources.  
Secondly, this model tended to foster autarkic beliefs among the authorities of the individual 
republics, resulting in each republic tending to regard itself as a separate “nation.”  Lastly, the 
Stalinist practice forged an exceptionally strong fusion between political and economic decision 
making.  This resulted in nearly all of the Party’s efforts after 1950 to move from a command 
economy to one based on indicative planning within a market system continually being 
constrained by the interference of political leaders in investment decisions (Lang 1975, 316). 
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The Beginnings of Decentralization (1950-1957) 
 
The second phase of postwar planning was a direct result of the Soviet-Yugoslav split in 1948 
and the subsequent economic boycott of Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union.  This greatly affected 
the economic and political development process of Yugoslavia and had important consequences 
for economic planning.  Due to the rift between Tito and Stalin over a number of issues, 
Yugoslavia was forced to reorient its foreign trade to the West and to abandon the trade 
agreements it had signed with the Soviet Union and its satellites.  This newfound Westward 
orientation forced Yugoslavia to develop defense industries in the face of an anticipated Soviet 
invasion.  This combined with the grain shortages in the wake of poor harvests in 1945-46 and 
1950 prompted the government to purchase foodstuffs and war material from the West (Lang 
1975, 316). 
 
In light of this newly acquired independence from the Soviet Union, Tito developed the 
“legitimating triad.”  The triad constituted the notions of “Brotherhood and Unity,” “Workers’ 
Self-Management,” and nonalignment.  The first two are of particular importance in the 
discussion of decentralization in Yugoslavia.  The concept of “Brotherhood and Unity” became a 
central pillar in the Yugoslav system and was based on the idea of bringing about inter-ethnic 
cooperation under a communist banner.  This was to be achieved by: 
declaring all peoples of socialist Yugoslavia “brothers” and urging them to desist from 
internecine fighting, operationalized in social governance through the use of the “ethnic 
key,” the principle of routine rotation of cadres, and the prohibition on party members to 
criticize the members or branch party organizations of other nationalities or their policies 
(Ramet 2005, xxi).   
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Workers’ Self-Management was a system whereby workers were represented in elected workers’ 
councils that made decisions regarding the operations of the plants in which they function 
(Ramet 2005, xxii).  The concept of Workers’ Self-Management was invented to distinguish the 
Yugoslav political and economic formula from that of the Soviets (Ramet 2005, 185).  The 
formula was simultaneously economic and political.  It was economic in the sense that it created 
a category of rather nebulously defined “social property” and assigned workers certain 
administrative prerogatives within their place of work.  It was political in the sense that self-
management was seen as a tool to bring about a movement that would ultimately result in the 
withering away of the state and create a “self-managing socialist system” (Ramet2005, 186).  
The Workers’ Councils had been organized in factories as the representatives of factory workers 
within communal political organizations.  However, they did not exercise any control over 
investment decisions or the conduct and selection of management (Lang 1975, 317).  In 1950, 
they were proclaimed to be the central agents of transition from state to social ownership of the 
means of production.  The first public pronouncement of the new doctrine of workers’ self-
management came on June 26, 1950, with the introduction of a law establishing expanded 
capacities for workers’ councils.  Although the communist party-state apparatus remained in 
command of the economy and continued to draw up plan targets, the law reinforced some 
tendencies toward administrative devolution (Ramet 2005, 190).   
 
After 1950, there was a transition in the administration of economic planning from federal to 
republican and local government levels.  In the same year, the republics were given authority of a 
large share of administrative responsibilities hitherto reserved by the central government, e.g., 
the supervision of electric power, mines, agriculture, forestry, light industry, and public works 
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(Ramet 2005, 190).  In Belgrade, the federal departments were now said to have been replaced 
by “coordination councils.”  Under the new system, enterprises were permitted to plan the range 
and volume of production in accordance with market criteria.   
 
On February 1, 1951, the Yugoslav government announced the abolition of the Federal State 
Control Commission, an economic regulatory body, and instructed the republics to abolish the 
counterparts to this body at their level.  The functions which had been entrusted to these 
commissions were now transferred to “higher economic associations” to be governed by 
workers’ councils.  From this, the idea of dismantling the state as such, in favor of free 
associations of workers, was discussed.  Further reorganization of the economic branches of both 
the federal and the republican governments was undertaken in mid-1952 towards greater 
decentralization.  It is important to note that there was considerable disagreement within the 
party in regard to this transformation.  There were those in the party who favored a faster rate of 
decentralization, control of industry by labor, less bureaucracy, and an expanded role for 
workers’ councils.  Others, however, favored a slower pace of development.  It is believed that at 
that time, Tito favored the latter group (Ramet 2005, 191).  Laws were passed in 1951 and 1952 
that established a number of basic proportions which remained under the control of federal 
planning authorities, including minimum and maximum wages, minimum production targets for 
each industry and region, and tax rates determining the contributions of enterprises to social 
funds, such as social security and wage funds (Lang 1975, 317). 
 
 
Yugoslavia’s evolving position in the world and the subsequent political and economic changes 
brought with it the need to retool the economic planning agenda.  In order to facilitate a more 
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rapid development of the economic base in Yugoslavia, funds were redirected to productive 
enterprises which could earn high returns from the sale of their products in Western markets.  
Most of these enterprises, of course, were located in the economically more advanced regions in 
Yugoslavia.  National economic survival replaced the equalization of incomes among the 
republics as the planners’ major goal (Lang 1975, 316).  This increase in importance of 
considerations of profitability was given an ideological underpinning in the doctrine of workers’ 
self-management.   
 
The continued integration of political and economic components within the planning structure 
had two consequences with respect to regional economic development.  The federal government, 
in retaining control over large proportions of enterprise earnings, continued to channel capital 
accumulation from enterprises in the North (Slovenia and Croatia) to less developed republics 
and regions (Lang 1975, 318).  Even more importantly, the use of much of this transferred 
accumulation was no longer determined by federal authorities.  One big problem with this is that 
the aid took the form of direct grants rather than loans and was loosely supervised.  The 
inefficient use of investment resources in the less developed regions was aggravated by the 
prevalence of “particularism,” which was the pursuit of narrow local, or republic, policies at the 
expense of the welfare of the country as a whole (Lang 1975, 319).  Economic planning practices 
during this period fell far short of the power transference envisaged in the proclamation of 
workers’ self-management as the guiding principle of Yugoslav socialist planning.  There were 
two problems that were especially pronounced.  The synthesis needed between plan and market, 
whereby the central planners confine their attention to broad macroeconomic decisions, could 
have occurred only if those decisions were few in number and related to a key set of aggregate 
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conditions.  Instead, central planners employed “manipulative planning,” which retained strict 
central controls over prices and taxes.  This resulted in the limiting of the freedom of enterprises 
to make investment decisions.  Such transfers in decision-making power that did occur took the 
form of “legislative decentralization,” which is the shifting of power to republican and local 
parties and governments (Lang 1975, 319).  It can be said that neither of these arose accidentally.  
The continuation of central planning controls occurred not only because of various “legacies of 
central planning,” but also due to federal planners’ perception that republican investment 
priorities deviated from their own vision of national development.  The more developed 
republics resisted the high priority assigned to the redistribution of income between regions, 
while poorer republics were opposed to the increasing tendency for planners to impose 
distributory criteria in evaluating regional investment proposals (Lang 1975, 320). 
 
 
Need for Further Reform (1957-1971) 
 
Beginning in 1957, the doctrine of workers’ self-management was extended to advance the 
criterion of profitability as the essential determinant of wage levels and investment decisions.  
This implied that labor productivity and profit maximization would determine standards of 
remuneration.  The new system placed the support for underdeveloped regions behind the goal of 
maximum growth for the economy as a whole (Lang 1975, 322).  The new doctrine threatened 
the economic structure of the less developed regions of Yugoslavia by indicating that the amount 
of investments from federal sources might be drastically reduced if levels of productivity were 
not raised.  Practical application of the new doctrine, however, developed more slowly than the 
rhetoric.  This led to considerable discord within the Party, which led to efforts to overcome the 
resistance to economic decentralization, especially on the part of local officials. 
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There were other troubles as well, particularly at the grassroots level.  In 1958 a letter was 
written at the highest level of the party and sent to all party organizations.  The letter stated that 
there were problems with corruption, unwarranted privileges, and “strong localist tendencies, 
coupled with tendencies to neglect and overlook the interests of the community as a whole” that 
threatened the country (Ramet 2005, 203).  The Party took this seriously, and the Executive 
Committee recognized that failing to correct the situation could hold up further success in the 
political development process of Yugoslavia (Ramet 2005, 204).  All this led to changes within 
the party and a debate about the direction of change.  Yugoslavia’s leaders appeared to be 
alternating between decentralization and recentralization.  When they spoke of decentralization, 
they had in mind devolution of administrative responsibility and the surrendering of some tasks 
to local leaders or party organizations, rather than the total withdrawal of the party from real 
authority (Ramet 2005, 205).  By 1959 pressure was building for a more coherent codification of 
constitutional principles than what had been provided by the 1953 Basic Law.  By 1961, pressure 
was also building for a reform of the economic system.  These pressures for political-
constitutional reform and for economic reform merged into a single reform movement (Ramet 
2005, 205). 
 
By 1962, the problems and shortcomings in the direction that political reforms had taken had 
become clear.  The central committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia identified 
localism, chauvinism, and national particularism as the major problems to address (Ramet 2005, 
208).  Tito himself addressed the dangers associated with localism and said that it posed a real 
danger that each republic was just out for itself, ignoring the interests of the Yugoslav 
community as a whole.  In an effort to curb growing polycentrism in Slovenia, Macedonia, and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  20
Croatia, Tito adopted disciplinary measures against republican politicians.  But this did not solve 
the problem; on the contrary, the conflicts only intensified.  The importance of this early 
evidence of inter-nationality and inter-republican frictions cannot be overemphasized since it 
was the central argument by later advocates of recentralization that these problems were created 
by decentralization.  However, in reality, decentralization was undertaken in order to address this 
issue and, in this regard, decentralization was partially successful (Ramet 2005, 208). 
 
The adoption of the third constitution in 1963 was an important step in the direction of political 
decentralization.  The fundamental design of the new constitution was to free economic units 
from political constraints and to establish productivity as the central criterion for new 
investment.  The principle feature of this constitution was an increase in the powers of the 
Workers’ Councils as opposed to republican and local political organizations.  With this 
legislation the status and prerogatives of the six republics were enhanced.  The 1963 Constitution 
also gave the executive councils in the republics a new freedom vis-à-vis the Federal Executive 
Council.   The new constitution also:  
 enshrined the right of the republics (though not of the provinces) to leave the Yugoslav 
federation;  
 prescribed that all federal laws and acts were to be published in the country’s four official 
languages (Serbo-Croatian, Croato-Serbian, Slovenian, and Macedonian); and 
 restructured the federal Skupstina (Assembly) into a five-chamber body, with its deputies 
elected through indirect elections, which replaced the direct electoral system (Ramet 
2005, 208). 
 
In 1965, further reforms were sought to counter the problem of slow economic growth.  The first 
was to abandon state investment planning and price reform by placing the distribution of profits 
at the discretion of the enterprises, which was to create a further incentive to operate more 
profitably.  There was also an effort to create more optimal use of scarce resources by increasing 
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both capital mobility and accountability (Lang 1975, 324).  These reforms represented the type 
of decentralization that had begun in the 1950’s that threatened unproductive enterprises and 
officials that supported them.  With these reforms, the Party attempted to remove politics from 
economic decision making while maintaining control over the economy through broad incentive 
plans (Lang 1975, 325).  In practice, the reforms reduced the power of only the republican 
politicians who tried to maintain rigid controls over enterprise decisions.  The republican role in 
development planning was more or less increased and a number of constitutional amendments in 
1969 and 1971 solidified the position of the republics as the principal guarantors of the rights of 
Yugoslav nationalities.  The reforms transferred considerable responsibility for administration of 
the economy from the federal government to the republics.  The reforms had an unmistakable 
devolutionary character:  their main features were the strengthening of the role of the republics 
(and enterprises) at the expense of the center (the federal government and the Belgrade banking 
monopoly) (Ramet 2005, 213).  Later amendments reduced the economic powers of the 
Federation to control only defense spending and production, foreign trade, and the monetary 
system (Dunn 1975, 128).   
 
Later Years (1974-1991) 
By 1974, decentralization was an important aspect of Yugoslavia’s style of governing.  All six 
republics had a considerable amount of autonomy, especially in comparison to the other Eastern 
European federations.  The Macedonian system was perhaps the most pronounced and had the 
following characteristics:  a broad range of local government competencies; considerable fiscal 
autonomy of local government entities; extensive administrative bodies at the republic and 
federal (Yugoslavia) level; elections of local officials without interference from central 
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government; a single-tiered government system; and large municipalities (Todorovski 2001, 
245).  This system had many positive aspects, namely local governments that were heavily 
involved in nearly all social and political spheres, and a local population that was accustomed to 
being involved in government.  However, there were many negative effects of this system.  The 
transfer of power to local governments was too extreme, and the majority of them did not have 
the capacity to manage the responsibilities effectively.  It was also common for municipalities to 
create and implement policies that ran counter to those of the federal government and other 
municipalities, which stifled development in many areas (Todorovski 2001, 245).   This led to 
uneven development between municipalities and within them. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 
Overview of Decentralization 
Decentralization is a process that seeks to disperse decision-making authority from a central 
authority, in this case a central government, to lower levels of government.  A decentralized 
system has a hierarchy that is more diffused horizontally in the governing structure than one that 
is based on a more unequal power relationship where the power and command resides at the top.  
In a more centralized system, the decisions are made by the top executive authorities and are 
based on pre-set policies that are enforced through the multiple tiers of the system (Sharma 2006, 
49).    In a more decentralized system, the central authorities delegate much of the decision-
making authority to lower tiers of government.  Such a system, if an adequate level of balance is 
achieved, results in a flow of information from bottom to top, which allows government officials 
to be well informed about the lower tiers.  In countries that wish to have stronger democratic 
political systems that are more effective, efficient and accountable, the goal is ultimately to give 
a better-informed citizenry improved access to the decision-making process through their elected 
representatives at the local level.    
 
There is not a single model that serves as a cure-all that can be uniformly transferred from one 
country to another.  In order to achieve a model of decentralization that is effective and efficient, 
each design must be tailored to the specific situation of the country, taking into consideration the 
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history, social and political culture, and economic situation.  It is for this reason that one must 
distinguish between the different forms and definitions of decentralization.   
 
Types of Decentralization 
1. Political decentralization 
Political decentralization refers to the procedures used to constitute governments below the 
national level (Eaton 2004, 4).  The aim in political decentralization is to ultimately give citizens 
and their elected officials more power in public decision-making.  Political decentralization is 
often a part of democratization by giving citizens more influence in the formation and 
implementation of policies.  The theory behind this is that locally elected representatives are 
known by their citizens and that these elected officials know the needs and desires of their 
constituents.  In this form, political power and authority is not entirely centralized in the national 
government, but rather is shared by other lower units of government (Rosenbloom 1998, 102).  
Political decentralization vests authority in elected and chartered subnational units of 
government, such as village councils, municipalities, and state or regional-level political entities.  
The most common form of political decentralization is devolution.  Devolution refers to a full 
transfer or shift of responsibility, decision and policy-making, resources, and revenue generation 
to a local form of government that is autonomous and fully independent from the devolving 
authority (ILO 2001, 4).  The units of government that are devolved are most often recognized as 
independent legal entities and are typically elected by the population they serve.  In such an 
arrangement, it is the subnational government that has full control of the policy-making and 
implementation process, and not the central government or any office or ministry from that level.  
A common arrangement under devolution is one in which the central government does not have 
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a ministry to plan and coordinate policies, and instead the departments in the lower units, such as 
the regional or local offices, make their own policies and coordinate their local offices (Shin 
1998, 106).  Devolution is a form of decentralization in which the central government has little 
or no control over the decisions made by the lower governmental units.
 
2. Administrative decentralization 
Administrative decentralization occurs when administrative responsibility, authority, and 
discretion are delegated to administrative units having jurisdiction over at least one program or 
function in a subnational geographic territory (Rosenbloom 1998, 104).  Broadly speaking, 
administrative decentralization refers to the rules that specify what subnational officials can do 
and with what resources (Eaton 2004, 4).  The aim is to transfer decision-making authority, 
resources, and responsibilities for the delivery of a select number of public services from the 
central government to other lower levels of government.  The existence of a field office, or 
regional office of an administrative agency, is evidence of administrative decentralization.  There 
are two main types of administrative decentralization, deconcentration and delegation.  
Decentralization that takes the form of deconcentration transfers authority and responsibility 
from one level of the central government to another, while maintaining the same hierarchical 
level of accountability from the local units to the central government ministry or agency which 
has been decentralized.  This can be seen most commonly as the first step in newly 
decentralizing governments as a way to improve service delivery (ILO 2001, 4).  With this 
arrangement, the central ministry directly controls the policy-making and operation of local 
offices through its regional and local offices.  The personnel belong to the central bureaucracy, 
and the central government is fully responsible for the financing of the services.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  26
Deconcentration, however, may promote more communication and cooperation between the 
local representatives of the ministry and subnational government officials (Shin 1998, 106). 
 
Administrative decentralization that constitutes delegation redistributes authority and 
responsibility to local units of government or agencies that are not always necessarily branches 
or local offices of the delegating authority, as is the case in a deconcentrated form.  While some 
transfer of accountability to the subnational units to which power is being delegated takes place, 
the bulk of accountability is still vertical, and ultimately to the delegating central unit (ILO 2001,  
4).  The production of certain services are delegated to subnational governments, or to 
corporations regulated by subnational governments, while allowing the central government to 
maintain control over decisions regarding the provision of the services provided by that office or 
department.  The central ministry defines the policy scope, objective, and the content of the 
function (Shin 1998, 106).  The administration of the service is delegated to subnational 
governments or corporations regulated by the subnational governments, all of which need to 
follow the central policy guidelines, but at the same time have some discretion in the operation 
and management of local planning offices (Shin 1998, 106).
 
3. Fiscal decentralization 
Dispersing financial responsibility to lower levels of government is a major component of 
decentralization.  In all forms of decentralization, whether political or administrative, some level 
of resource reallocation is made to allow the lower level governmental units to execute the 
decentralized functions effectively.  Arrangements for resource allocation are usually negotiated 
between local and central authorities, and they are dependent on several factors including 
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concerns for interregional equity, availability of central and local resources, and local fiscal 
management capacity (ILO 2001, 4).  Some common arrangements to allow for fiscal 
decentralization are:  portions of national taxes, or all of certain nationally imposed and collected 
taxes, are for the exclusive use of local governments; a central ministry directly subsidizes the 
recurrent or capital budgets of the subnational units; central ministries provide grants for local 
development; banks or quasi-bank authorities provide loans and grants for capital projects; and 
funds derived from international assistance agencies are channeled to the subnational units 
(Rondinelli 1984, 44).  Fiscal decentralization can take the form of self-financing or cost 
recovery through user charges, increasing local or own-source revenues through property or sales 
taxes, intergovernmental transfers from the central government to local governments, and 
municipal borrowing (Sharma 2006, 51).   
 
4. Market decentralization 
This form of decentralization shifts responsibilities from the public to the private sector.  Market 
decentralization is done in favor of non-public entities where planning and administrative 
responsibilities, or other public functions, are transferred from government to voluntary, private, 
or non-governmental institutions.  This often involves contracting out partial service provision or 
administration functions, deregulation, or privatization (ILO 2001, 4).  The functions that were 
the responsibility of the government are carried out by businesses, community groups, 
cooperatives, private voluntary associations, and other non-governmental organizations. 
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5.  Federalism 
Federalism is a form of decentralization that divides political authority and sovereignty between 
a central government and state or provincial governments.  The states or provinces have a 
substantial measure of legal or constitutional sovereignty, which is supreme political power and 
authority (Rosenbloom 1998, 100).  This means that political authority is not centralized in the 
national government but shared by other governmental units.  These units of government are also 
subordinate in many major legal and constitutional respects to a central government.  Federalism 
stands in contrast to decentralization, which has the form of “unitary” political systems that do 
not have quasi-sovereign governmental units that coexist with the national government.  All 
sovereignty is exercised by the national government in decentralized political systems.  Unitary 
governments may delegate administrative and political authority to municipalities or other 
governmental bodies, but these bodies have no inherent sovereignty or any authority other than 
that which is given to them by the national government (Rosenbloom 1998, 100).  Political 
systems that have these attributes constitute political and administrative decentralization, but not 
federalism.   
Rationale for Decentralization 
Democracy is fundamentally based on the notion of representation of the various groups within a 
country in the political process.  Achieving a suitable measure of representation for ethnic and 
other territorially based cultural groups can be one of the biggest challenges a nation faces.  
Decentralization can be a way to ensure a suitable amount of representation in heterogeneous 
nations.  Along with representation, responsiveness and accountability are equally important in 
any political reform process that seeks to build a sound constitutional democracy that more 
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adequately meets the needs of the citizenry.  Efficiency is another common goal of political 
reforms.   
 
A major concern of all governments, and especially those in transition and in developing 
countries, is how to make the public sector more accountable to the citizens, while at the same 
time making it more efficient and effective in policy making and service delivery.  Settling on 
the form of decentralization that devolves the appropriate degree of authority to subnational 
governments and that satisfies the need to have a more representative, accountable, and efficient 
government is crucial.  While decentralization in and of itself does not automatically mean 
democratization, it is very commonly associated with the political reforms and efforts to 
democratize and foster grassroots participation in developing countries.  Decentralization can 
provide a feasible solution to many problems of inefficiency faced by developing countries.  As 
such, there are economic and political rationales for decentralization.   
 
Decentralization, like federalism, is based on the idea that in order to be responsive and effective, 
elected and appointed officials must know the people they are serving.  By vesting a good deal of 
political authority in small governmental units, the likelihood that governmental officials will 
represent the will of the people is increased.  In short, the solution to such representational 
problems is thought to be to allow local people to control the governance of local matters.  This 
is rooted in “public choice” theory, which is the idea that smaller political jurisdictions are better 
able than larger ones to respond to the preferences of their citizens (Rosenbloom 1998, 102).  
Public choice theories explore the possibility that mobility in a decentralized, multi-jurisdiction 
context can facilitate better matching of citizen preferences and government policy through 
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"sorting" and can lead to smaller, more efficient, and less corrupt government (Rodden 2004, 
482).  It is not uncommon for the lower administrative units, i.e. regional, field, and installation 
levels, to adapt the national guidelines to local conditions.  They can also coordinate the 
activities of local administrators in the same geographic area.   
 
There are three primary functions of the government in the majority of developing countries 
(Shin 1998, 98).  The first is to provide the social and public goods that the private market fails 
to provide efficiently.  This typically includes services such as health, sewerage, sanitation, 
community development, infrastructure, and law enforcement.  It is important to understand that 
there are considerable differences in the extent to which governments are involved with such 
services in developing countries, as is true in the more developed ones.  In general, governments 
in developing countries are much more involved in the provision of these services than in more 
developed countries.  This is due to the fact that the private market is so much more 
underdeveloped in those countries and has not extended its reach into these areas for lack of 
resources and small likelihood of attaining a reasonable profit (Shin 1998, 98).  The second 
function of governments deals with the redistribution of incomes.  Developing countries tend to 
rely on the taxation of capital investment and trade activities to pay for public services, while 
more developed countries rely on income taxes and other direct taxation (Shin 1998, 98).  This is 
done by the governments to more equally distribute wealth and resources in order to reduce the 
income gap with these countries.  Economic stabilization is the third primary function of 
governments.  Fiscal policies play a large role in the efforts of governments to stimulate 
economic activity by means of government spending and regulating the supply of money.  In 
many countries, state-run companies play an important role in stabilizing the economy.   
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While these functions of government are essential to the development of a country, the 
governments’ performance has often been poor and the quality of service low.  Many programs 
aimed at addressing issues with these functions fail to cater to the needs of ordinary citizens.  
These problems thwart social and economic development, but can also lead to political 
discontent.  The grievances accumulate over time and often lead to political instability, creating 
the vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment (Shin 1998, 99).  One way to redress these 
problems is to decentralize the policymaking and administrative responsibilities to subnational 
governments.  Generally speaking, decentralization is often justified on the grounds that it aids in 
promoting principles of grassroots democracy, economic efficiency, administrative 
responsiveness, and structural diversity (Shin 1998, 99). 
 
Policy and administrative responsiveness is the most commonly used rationale for 
decentralization.  In traditional public administrative theory, there is recognition that 
organization by “place” is often an appropriate basis for establishing administrative 
arrangements (Rosenbloom 1998, 104).  This is especially true in larger countries when a 
country varies widely in terms of geography, where it can widely vary from one place to another 
and have certain cultural, political, and economic conditions that are specific to one region.  
When this occurs, there is a high likelihood that a centralized administration will fail to adapt to 
local or regional conditions, much less understand and meet the needs of the populations.  The 
idea behind decentralizing authority and policymaking to the lower levels of government is that 
local governments are close to the users of public services, and thereby have access to more 
information about the quantity and quality of demand for public services than does the national 
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government (Shin 1998, 99).  Because local governments have this advantage, they can provide 
public services which meet the specific needs of local constituents and avoid wasteful provision 
of resources.  Decentralization is a very promising form of distribution of power and resources in 
that it can enable a more effective use of available funds.  Local government leaders know the 
needs of their communities, and they can also better determine the local capacity for 
development and the best measures to achieve it (Grochowski 2001, 147). 
 
The responsiveness argument is further reinforced by a consideration of the transaction cost 
problems in developing countries.  Decentralization is often used as a means of reducing 
overload and congestion in the channels of administration and communication (Rondinelli 1984, 
5).  Transaction cost problems result from centralized provision of services that require extensive 
information exchange and a complex organizational structure that is needed to implement 
national policies (Shin 1998, 99).  This process and structure is expensive and, through 
decentralization of service provision to regions and municipalities, the central government can 
reduce red tape, simplify organizational hierarchies, and reduce costly communication 
networking (Shin 1998, 100).  If the decision-making and policy implementation can be 
delegated to subnational governments, the central government can reduce many administrative 
responsibilities, while still authorizing and regulating some areas of regional or local policies, 
depending on the form of decentralization chosen.  Some studies have shown that 
decentralization can successfully improve the likelihood of policy acceptance and efficiency in 
developing countries (Shin 1998, 99).  Centralized administration can also present the challenge 
of becoming overextended and far-flung to ensure responsibility and compliance with national 
directives by local administrators (Rosenbloom 1998, 104).  The concept of “span of control,” 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  33
which is the number of underlings reporting to a supervising administrator, is important in this 
regard.  There is a limit to the number of subordinates an administrative official can effectively 
supervise.  Administrative decentralization can be a way of keeping the span of control 
manageable by organizing on the basis of local administrative units.  By interposing field and 
regional offices between local administrators and national headquarters, the number of 
administrators reporting directly to the headquarters can be sharply reduced (Rosenbloom 1998, 
105).    
 
While far from perfect, decentralization efforts around the world have seen many positive 
results.  There are countless examples of decentralization increasing access of people in 
previously neglected rural regions and communities to central government resources and 
institutions; increases in participation and local governments’ ability to influence central 
government policies and programs; improvements in the administrative and technical capability 
of regional and local units of government; and creation of organizations at the regional and local 
level to plan and manage development (Rondinelli 1984,  45). 
Limitations and Considerations 
Decentralization is not a panacea and should not be indiscriminately administered as a remedy in 
all situations.  Like all political systems, a decentralized system has its limits, which should be 
considered in any situation.   
 
Since government policymakers and donor institutions began promoting decentralization in the 
1970’s, the results have often been mixed.  This is particularly true when decentralization is 
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justified on the grounds that it increases administrative efficiency and effectiveness.  Despite the 
dubious success rate of these reforms and evidence that decentralization does not always live up 
to expectations, decentralization continues to be promoted by policymakers and the international 
community.  Part of the reason for this is that decentralization often serves as an instrument for 
achieving purely political objectives.  Despite the fact that the justification for decentralization 
programs is the goal of increasing administrative efficiency and effectiveness, they are 
frequently assessed, not by their economic or administrative results, but rather by their political 
effects (Rondinelli 1984, 27).  The result is that programs are continued and deemed successful 
without assessing whether or not policymaking and service delivery is any more efficient or 
effective, so long as the broader political aims are met.  If decentralization is to truly be a means 
of improving administrative effectiveness and efficiency, then the effects on these areas must not 
be overlooked.  This is not to say that decentralization should never be justified on political 
grounds, but that programs that aim to achieve more efficient and effective administration should 
be designed carefully and realistically.  Another reason that decentralization has received 
continued support is that highly centralized political systems are inherently inefficient and 
ineffective in many areas of policymaking and service delivery, especially in implementing 
programs at the local level.  Often, policymakers operate under the assumption that the solution 
to such problems is simply to create a system that is the opposite of a centralized system without 
sufficiently weighing the costs and benefits of doing so.  Recent empirical studies have taken 
issue with such assumption.  Several studies have found that decentralization and federalism are 
associated with higher levels of perceived corruption, larger government, macroeconomic 
instability, and under some conditions lower growth (Rodden 2004, 482).  The result has been 
that the benefits of decentralization and federalism have been called into question. 
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One argument against decentralization is that local governments may be incompetent and lack 
the resources and information that would otherwise allow them to make appropriate policies and 
handle the newly acquired competencies.  Decentralization is often viewed by politicians simply 
as a way to increase local participation and reduce political discontent against the central 
government, with little or no regard to the political and financial ramifications of such policies.  
Unfortunately, these arrangements are frequently poorly planned, not well implemented, and 
inefficient.  In such circumstances, the quality of public services is rarely improved.  If 
politicians and governments better understand the rationales of decentralization, it can be 
differentiated from either an ideologically motivated policy or a politically motivated one that is 
conceived primarily to appease certain political interests (Shin 1998, 99).  Above all, rather than 
enhancing the independent authority of state and municipal governments, decentralization often 
creates a more complex form of governance that bears little resemblance to the forms of 
decentralization envisioned in textbooks on fiscal federalism or in public choice theories 
(Rodden 2004, 482). 
 
1. Collective Action Problems 
One problem that can arise in decentralization efforts is that the natural inclination of people to 
act in their own self-interest and attempt to maximize individual net benefits over the greater 
social or political good.  This is hardly surprising given peoples’ and, in this case, political 
entities’, rational behavior and the fear that exists when a legislative or fiscal decision may result 
in a loss to that entity, regardless if that threat is real or perceived.  Such behavior is termed the 
“collective action problem” that can exist in attempts to decentralize and is particularly serious in 
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allocative policy areas, such as the provision of public goods and the management of common 
resources (Shin 198, 100).  Such behavior can result in a rapid depletion of resources, increase 
the cost of coordination and monitoring, and jeopardize political agreements that benefit local 
jurisdictions (Shin 1998, 100).  In cases where a collective action problem exists, it is often 
necessary to have some degree of centralization at the policy making and implementation level to 
limit the harm caused by such behavior, often in the role of facilitator, coordinator, contract 
enforcer, and arbitrator to resolve intergovernmental conflicts (Shin 1998, 101).  Redistributive 
and stabilization policies are also susceptible to collective action problems, which can both be 
rife with difficulties in administration and policy planning.  It is for this reason that the design 
and implementation of such policies should be done by the central government (Shin 1998, 101). 
 
2. Externality Arguments 
Externality effects are the benefits or costs incurred by other parties that are not “internalized” in 
policy calculations by the policymakers (Shin 1998, 101).  If local governments are responsible 
for making policies and providing public services that entail significant spillover effects or 
externalities, the public services will be either under- or over-provided.  It is in such cases when 
the national government should be responsible for such policy because it has a wide scope of 
jurisdiction and can therefore internalize all the benefits and costs of the policy in its 
policymaking process (Shin 1998, 101).  When externalities exist, individual jurisdictions may 
not consider the social benefits that are beyond their own jurisdictional boundary.  When this 
occurs, they are less willing to invest in those public services, which results in their under-
provision.  It is when such behavior occurs that a certain degree of centralization is desirable 
(Shin 1998, 102).  There are certain areas in which centralization is generally better than a more 
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decentralized form of policymaking and service, particularly in redistributive and stabilization 
policies. 
 
3. Scale Economies 
Some public services should be centralized, or be co-administered by local governments, at the 
regional level because they yield economies of scale (Shin 1998, 102).  Such services require 
fixed or quasi-fixed capital inputs, give increasing returns from technological inputs, and have 
limited congestion costs for provision.  In terms of managerial efficiency, decentralizing these 
services and having the supply of these services duplicated by different local governments is 
wasting social resources (Shin 1998, 102).  These scale economies are more apparent in some 
allocative policies than in redistributive or stabilization policies.  It is not uncommon for poorly 
planned decentralization policies to inadvertently result in the sacrifice of the benefits of scale 
economies and expertise (Shin 1998, 102).  That being said, it is important to consider that scale 
economies do not increase infinitely.  After a certain point, diseconomies of scale will arise due 
to coordination problems, congestion costs, or technological constraints.  It is for this reason that 
the degree of centralization should be determined based on the nature of the public service 
provided (Shin 1998, 102). 
 
4. Capacity Concerns 
The capacity of local governments to handle newly acquired responsibilities is one factor that 
can greatly affect the success of the decentralization process.  Many studies of decentralization 
have shown that the performance and impact of decentralized administrative units have not met 
the goals of the programs.  This is often due to the local units lacking financial control, qualified 
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personnel, and the capacity to carry out the responsibilities transferred to them (Rondinelli 1984, 
34).  The capacity of local government depends on many factors, such as the quantity and quality 
of local officials, the knowledge and data base required for effective policymaking, technology 
available to policy planners and implementers, and the revenue available (Shin 1998, 102).   
 
Autonomous financial responsibility is at the core of the concept of decentralization (Rondinelli 
1084, 43).  Many decentralization programs have granted local governments limited revenue-
raising powers and the sums raised are insufficient.  This is due to central governments either not 
distributing the necessary allocated funds or, when the local governments possess the authority to 
impose taxes, the units have such a weak tax base that they are not able to generate sufficient 
local revenues (Rondinelli 1984, 43).  Instead of transferring real revenue-raising authority to 
local governments, central authorities merely transfer resources.  Some common arrangements 
are: portions of national taxes, or all of certain nationally imposed and collected taxes, are for the 
exclusive use of local governments; a central ministry directly subsidizes the recurrent or capital 
budgets of the subnational units; central ministries provide grants for local development; banks 
or quasi-bank authorities provide loans and grants for capital projects; and funds derived from 
international assistance agencies are channeled to the subnational units (Rondinelli 1984, 44).  
Such arrangements do little more than increase the dependency of local authorities on the central 
government and the subsidies.  Central governments might attempt to restrict the fiscal autonomy 
of subnational governments not only through conditional grants and regulations governing local 
taxation, but also through formal limitations on subnational borrowing.  The ability to access 
credit markets or other sources of deficit finance independently is an important component of 
subnational fiscal autonomy (Rodden 2004, 486).  If decentralization is to be successful, it makes 
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little sense to have local governments providing public services while the central government 
still controls the tax base and revenue decisions.  It is difficult for local policy makers to make 
effective decisions if they lack the necessary financial resources, expertise, and information.  
Without sufficient capacity, the central government will still control the agenda of local 
policymaking and the administration of the policies, and local governments will remain 
powerless and dependent (Shin 1998, 102).  The capacity constraints can also impose costs and 
cause inefficiency in developing countries because many local governments do not have the 
personnel or the financial, institutional, and information capacity to handle the tasks (Shin 1998, 
102). 
 
5. Political Constraints 
Officials within the central government can be resistant to allowing any political power and 
authority to be devolved to lower levels of government, particularly in formerly socialist 
countries with a tradition of centralized governments.  Such political realities can result in a 
power struggle between those pushing for decentralization and those that strive to derail such 
efforts, which significantly slows the progress of decentralization.  Officials and politicians in 
the central government may see decentralization as a threat to their career stability, political 
security, and economic interests (Shin 1998, 103).  Therefore, they have little incentive to 
support local officials and help implement decentralization policies.  Lack of political 
commitment for decentralization is often manifested in delays of the release of allocated funds 
and incomplete distribution of these.  Central government officials can also withhold information 
and expertise from local officials.  Delaying or withholding funds and other resources can slow 
down the implementation of programs, which can leave local governments unable to execute 
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their new responsibilities, thereby affecting the entire decentralization process. Rondinelli points 
to several examples in Latin America and Asia where decentralization programs have resulted in 
greater dependence of local administrative units on the central government.  There are many 
instances where innovative decentralization programs were centrally created but not linked to 
established local organizations and sources of political and financial support (Rondinelli 1984, 
31).  What often happens is that authority is delegated to local organizations, but they are not 
given the resources to perform their new functions.  The end result is that local governments 
function as bureaucratic instruments of the center and act merely to extend centrally established 
priorities and controls, thereby not as channels through which the conditions and needs of the 
local communities are articulated and addressed (Rondinelli 1984, 31).  An effective way to 
address the policy and political autonomy of local government is to ask whether the central 
government has the legal right to override the decisions and policies of lower levels of 
government with an ease that calls that very authority into question (Rodden 2004, 486).   
 
There are other ways in which political constraints can negatively affect decentralization efforts.  
Decentralization reforms are often part of government efforts to democratize the politics of a 
country.  The political pressure of citizen participation and democratization trends may 
sometimes push for decentralization efforts that result in inefficiency and weaken policy 
effectiveness (Shin 1998, 103).  It is in such instances when it is especially important to consider 
other rationales, such as externalities, collective action problems, and scale economies.  Political 
pressure may distort these considerations and make decentralization a panacea to stabilize the 
political order (Shin 1998, 103).   
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Promoting accountability can sometimes be at odds with the push for greater efficiency.  
Opening up public administration and policymaking to public scrutiny can slow these processes.  
Public officials might be dissuaded from taking courses of actions that are more efficient because 
of the time and resources that will be diverted by providing information to the public.  While 
efficiency and accountability are not mutually exclusive, achieving the right balance between the 
two that results in a system that provides for both is one of the great challenges of political 
reforms that seek to establish a more democratic form of government. 
 
6. Regional Differences 
In countries where political schisms based on regional conflicts have brought about regional 
disparities, it is difficult to achieve balanced regional development in the decentralization 
process.  Theoretically, differences between regions, whether in culture, ideology, economy, 
religion, or geography, should encourage more decentralization in policymaking and 
administration (Shin 1998, 103).  When regional differences become a potential source of 
conflict and instability, the scope of decentralization is usually curbed by the central government 
because of the fear that when these regions attain more autonomous power, they may eventually 
demand independence (Shin 1998, 103).  Even though apparent regional differences are present, 
the political reality may limit the possible scope of decentralization.  Usually, only some degree 
of administrative decentralization is given to subnational governments as a “technical solution” 
to the problem of over-centralization (Shin 1998, 103).   
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European Charter of Local Self-Government 
The European Charter of Local Self-Government was adopted by the Council of Europe in 
October of 1985.   The ratifying member states are bound to guaranteeing the political, 
administrative and financial independence of local authorities.  It stipulates that the law of local 
self-government will be recognized in each country’s legislation and, where practicable, in the 
constitution.  The Charter has had a significant impact on the political reform process throughout 
Europe, and even more so in Central and Eastern Europe as the countries make the transition 
from socialism to Western-oriented, free-market capitalism.  This document brought the need for 
more decentralized political systems to the forefront of political reform discourse, and has held 
governments accountable in meeting the requirements laid out in the Charter.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine the theoretical basis of the Charter of Local Self-Government and its 
influence on models of decentralization chosen throughout Europe.   
 
In recognizing that local authorities are one of the main foundations of any democratic regime, 
the Charter secures the right of citizens to participate in the conduct of public affairs.  The 
language of the Charter reflects the democratic principles shared by the member states, which 
stress that it is at the local level that the right of citizens to participate can be most directly 
exercised.  The Charter states that the existence of local authorities with real responsibilities can 
provide an administration which is both effective and close to the citizen.  The Charter 
acknowledges that the safeguarding and reinforcement of local self-government is an important 
contribution to the construction of a society based on principles of democracy and the 
decentralization of power.  This requires the existence of local authorities endowed with 
democratically constituted decision-making bodies that possess a wide degree of autonomy with 
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regard to their responsibilities and the resources required for their fulfillment (European Charter 
of Local Self-Government 1985, Preamble).  Local self-government denotes the right and the 
ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share 
of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population 
(Article 3).   That right is to be exercised by freely elected councils or assemblies.   
Assessing the Results of Decentralization 
Most studies of decentralization have focused primarily on the fiscal authority of the subnational 
units of government and to a far lesser extent on policy and political authority.  Empirical studies 
of decentralization focus exclusively on the balance of expenditures and revenues between 
governments, relying on the combined regional and local share of total government spending.  
Without additional data on the regulatory framework on fiscal authority, these studies do not 
inspire much confidence in their usefulness as a composite measure of decentralized authority 
(Rodden 2004, 48).   In order to adequately assess the effectiveness of decentralization, it is 
crucial to explore the complex arrangement for policy, political, and fiscal autonomy of the 
subnational government of each country.  Many studies of decentralization suggest that four 
broad factors that affect the success or failure of decentralization must be understood.  The first 
is the degree to which central political leaders and bureaucracies support decentralization and the 
organizations to which responsibilities are transferred.  Successful decentralization depends on 
the national political leaders’ commitment to decentralize planning and administrative functions, 
the ability and willingness of the national bureaucracy to facilitate and support decentralized 
development activities, and the capacity of field officials of national agencies and departments to 
coordinate their activities at the local level (Rondinelli 1984, 47).  The second is the degree to 
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which the dominant behavior, attitudes, and culture are conducive to decentralized decision 
making and administration.  The most important factors are the willingness of local officials to 
support and perform decentralized management functions, the quality of local leadership, the 
attitudes of people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behavior 
are compatible with decentralized procedures for planning, decision making, and management.  
Also crucial are the attitudes and behaviors of central and local government officials toward the 
citizenry in determining whether or not decentralization will be effective (Rondinelli 1984, 52).   
The third is the degree to which policies and programs are appropriately designed and organized 
to promote decentralized decision making and management.  This includes the organization 
variables that influence the outcomes of decentralization efforts.  They include the clarity and 
simplicity of the structures and procedures used to decentralize, the ability of the implementing 
agency staff to interact with higher level authorities, and the degree to which components of 
decentralized programs are integrated (Rondinelli 1984, 57).   The fourth is the degree to which 
adequate financial, human, and physical resources are made available to the organizations to 
which responsibilities are transferred.   Central governments often negate the authority of local 
governments by refusing to transfer financial, administrative, and technical resources to them.  
The lack of independent sources of revenue severely weakens local governments’ ability to carry 
out their responsibilities (Rondinelli 1984, 66).   
 
Rondinelli suggests using the following criteria when assessing decentralization: 
1. The degree to which decentralization contributes to achieving broad political objectives, 
such as promoting political stability; mobilizing support and cooperation for national 
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development policies; and providing heterogeneous regions, interests, and communities 
with a  stake in the survival of the political system. 
2. The degree to which decentralization increases administrative effectiveness, by 
promoting greater coordination among units of the national government and between 
them and subnational administrative units, local governments, and nongovernmental 
organizations, or by encouraging closer cooperation among organizations to attain 
mutually acceptable development goals. 
3. The degree to which decentralization contributes to promoting economic and managerial 
efficiency, by allowing governments at both the central and local levels to achieve 
development goals in a more cost-effective manner. 
4. The degree to which decentralization increases government responsiveness to the needs 
and demands of various interest groups within society. 
5. The degree to which decentralization contributes to greater self-determination and self-
reliance among subordinate units of administration or nongovernmental organizations in 
promoting development or meeting highly valued needs within society. 
6. The appropriateness of the means by which policies and programs are designed and 
carried out to achieve the goals of decentralization; however they are defined (Rondinelli 
1984, 29). 
 
Any assessment of decentralization should take a more holistic approach.  Examining the 
political effects, or any one aspect of the reform process, alone will result in an incomplete study.  
Therefore, it is essential to take into consideration the cultural and historical context of each 
country, which aids in correctly studying the political and legal ramifications of such policies.  
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By the same token, focusing solely on the financial aspect of decentralization, while an important 
part of any decentralization program, similarly results in an incomplete examination of 
decentralization.  While undertaking a study that examines all the salient aspects of reform is a 
daunting task, it is nevertheless critical that a complete and thorough study be undertaken if one 
seeks to fully understand the impact and success of a decentralization program.    
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Chapter 4 
Methodology
Methodologies Used 
In order to get the clearest picture possible of decentralization and its effects on planning in 
Macedonia, it was necessary to employ more than one method of research and analysis.  
Therefore, a case study analysis and key informant interviews were identified as the best means 
of answering the research question.     
 
Case Study 
The case study of decentralization in Macedonia begins with a thorough review of all legislation 
that has been enacted since the country gained independence in 1991, and analyzes the relevant 
developments that have been made in the process in relation to planning.  This type of analysis 
allowed the researcher to answer the “how and why” and focuses on contemporary events, all of 
which is crucial in understanding the decentralization process in Macedonia (Yin 2003, 5).  The 
case study relies on data drawn from a variety of sources, most of which were reports and 
publications from the main international organizations that work with the government of 
Macedonia in a number of capacities to assist in the reform process, and are, therefore, at the 
forefront of research and the best source of such information.  The organizations that have had 
the most experience working in this field are the United States Agency for International 
Development, the United Nations Development Program, and the Open Society Institute.    
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Key Informant Interviews 
The other method of research is conducting interviews of “key informants,” who are people 
familiar with the decentralization process in Macedonia.  There is a strong presence of 
international organizations that are active in the political reform process, and each has a program 
or division that specializes in decentralization.  It was assumed when beginning the thesis that 
the people identified have considerable knowledge and insight into how Macedonia has 
performed in executing the reforms of the decentralization process and would be able to answer 
the questions pertaining to the research.  The following is a list of interviewees who participated 
in this study: 
 Jan Herczyski, Warsaw University, Poland; United States consulting company DAI as a 
consultant on a United States Agency for International Development project in 
Macedonia (first Local Government Reform Project, later Make Decentralization Work); 
 
 Islam Yusufi, European Agency for Reconstruction; 
 
 
 An employee of an international development consulting firm who wished to remain 
anonymous. 
 
Conducting interviews of professionals who are working in Macedonia with a number of 
international organizations provides invaluable insight into the decentralization process.  The 
interviews were especially important because they are a means of obtaining the most current 
information, providing an assessment of recent developments that contribute to the evaluation of 
the reform process that information from the other sources could not provide.  The recent, on-
the-ground information provided an opportunity to enhance and substantiate information derived 
from the case study. 
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Chapter 5
Analysis
Case Study Analysis 
The process of decentralization in Macedonia began with the drafting of the Constitution in 1991 
after achieving independence from Yugoslavia.  In the sixteen years since, countless steps have 
been made to decentralize.  However, many of these efforts have been misguided and resulted in 
the central government retaining power, or have left the municipalities unable to effectively 
deliver the services they were assigned.  Further complicating this process is the mixture of 
political inefficiency and ethnic disputes that have plagued Macedonia since gaining its 
independence in 1991.  In too many instances, attempts to decentralize have been thrown off 
course by a number of factors, most notably the will for decentralization being much more 
evident in the government’s rhetoric than in its actions.  The international community has been 
increasingly involved in the decentralization process over the years and has had a significant 
impact on the overall process, having identified the need for a stable and democratic Macedonia 
as being in the interest of the citizens of Macedonia, as well as the entire region and beyond.  
1. Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991 
Article 8 of the 1991 Constitution established local self-government as one of the fundamental 
values of the Republic of Macedonia.  The right of local self-government is guaranteed under 
Article 114, which defines the municipalities as local self-government units in which communal 
self-government may be organized (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991).  Under 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  50
Article 115 of the 1991 Constitution, local municipalities were granted a very limited amount of 
power and had very few competencies for which they were responsible.  Local governments 
were responsible for communal activities (trash collection and parks), urban planning, culture, 
sports, social and child care, and primary health care.  Although any local government had the 
right to perform its duties and select priorities without interference from the central government, 
the central government was still able to exert control over the local municipalities in certain 
situations.  Although the constitution stipulated that the municipalities were to be financed by 
their own sources of revenue as established by law, the financial autonomy of local governments 
was severely limited.  The local governments were required to report their financial situations to 
the Ministry of Finance, which then determined the size of the local governments’ budgets.  The 
central government monitored the legality of local government activities and could suspend any 
act adopted by local authorities that did not comply with the Constitution.  The central 
government could also supervise and provide guidelines for a task which was entrusted to a local 
authority, as well as exercise financial control over the project (Todorovski 2001, 251).          
 
The government of the Republic of Macedonia had the right to dissolve a city council that failed 
to meet for a period of more than six months or that held fewer than two meetings in a year.  It 
could also do so if a council failed to pass a budget for the next year before December 31st.  The 
central government also had the right to dissolve a council if it adopted an act which endangered 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.  If a mayor of a local municipality was not 
willing or not able to perform his or her duties, the central government could appoint a 
commissioner until the next elections (Todorovski 2001, 252). 
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The financial autonomy of the local governments was also guaranteed, though limited, in that 
they financed a portion of their budgets with their own revenues through charges and fees for 
various utility and administrative services, referred to as communal fees.  The local governments 
managed some tax revenues, such as the property tax, inheritance and gift taxes, and the tax on 
real estate and rights transactions, but these were insufficient for the local governments to be 
genuinely autonomous financially.  Because of this, local governments could exercise fiscal 
autonomy by utilizing funds from state grants, domestic and foreign donations, and other 
revenues transferred to local governments (Todorovski 2001, 267).  The central government still 
collected the value added tax, excise tax, profit tax, and personal income tax, which are all the 
highest quality revenue sources (UNDP 2004, 26).  All of this meant that the local governments 
were still largely dependent on the central government. 
 
The Constitution of 1991 addressed the issue of decentralization, but fell short of providing a 
solid framework for it.  The right to local self-government was explicitly guaranteed in the 
Constitution, but it did not allow for decentralization in any discernible way.  This led to a 
concentration and centralization of power to the national government, making Macedonia one of 
the most centralized countries in all of Europe.   
 
2. Local Government Act, 1995 
In 1995, the Local Government Act was adopted by the Macedonian Parliament.  The act 
transferred revenue-raising authority to the municipalities, created their financial system, and 
instituted two phases of fiscal decentralization (Todorovski 2001, 266). This act was the first 
major effort to increase the role that local governments had in governing and managing their 
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populations and reduced the interference of the central government in the day-to-day operations 
of the municipalities.  While there were some changes in the division of power between the 
central government and the municipalities, the biggest changes were related to financing.  This 
act allowed for an expansion of the revenue sources for the local governments.  Under this act, 
local governments were entitled to a share of the sales tax on goods and services and other 
economic activities.  These powers had previously been reserved solely for the central 
government.  They were also able to collect on the profits from municipal public enterprises and 
from the fines for violations of municipal regulations, both of which went to the central 
government under the Constitution of 1991.  Revenues from taxes granted by the central 
government were also disbursed to the local governments, but these funds were unevenly 
distributed based on political and ethnic preferences, i.e., those municipalities whose elected 
local officials belonged to the ruling party in the central government and had an ethnic 
Macedonian population (Todorovski 2001, 266).   
  
The Local Government Act created a number of state grants that local governments utilized as 
sources of revenue.  The Fund for Economically Underdeveloped Areas was administered by the 
Ministry of Development and benefited individuals and legal entities.  The majority of the 
recipients were rural municipalities that needed funds for local infrastructure, such as roads, 
water pipes, primary schools, and health centers.  The Fund for Communal Activities and Roads 
was another state fund that targeted the construction and repair of roads and streets in all local 
government units.  The Fund for Pipes and Sewerage financed construction, repair, and 
maintenance of water supply systems and sewer networks in all the municipalities.  These three 
funds provided the necessary funds to carry out these functions that would not have been 
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provided with the revenues the municipalities relied on previously.  Municipalities became 
increasingly dependent on these funds, and the share of municipalities’ revenues that these funds 
represented increased significantly every year, jumping from 22.2 percent in 1994 to 42.2 
percent of municipalities’ revenues in 1998 (Todorovski 2001, 269).  This was coupled with a 
decrease in the independent or original revenues that municipalities generated themselves, from 
77.6 percent of their total revenue in 1994, to 55.1 percent in 1998.  This was due to 
establishment of these funds, but also due to the overall increase in the number of municipalities, 
most of which were in rural, underdeveloped areas with poor financial resources of their own and 
were, therefore, dependant on these funds from the central government.    
 
In 1996, the Law on Territorial Division of the Republic of Macedonia and Demarcation of the 
Municipal Boundaries was passed.  This law increased the number of municipalities from 34 to 
123 plus the City of Skopje and redefined their territorial boundaries.  This meant a dramatic 
reduction in the size and populations of municipalities.  The idea was that these smaller units of 
local government would allow for common interests to be more easily identified in order to solve 
problems.  It was also to further increase the responsiveness of local governments and to have 
citizens closer to their local governing bodies.  This act created a more streamlined 
organizational structure that reflected this reduction in territorial size and competencies of local 
governments (Todorovski 2001, 247).  This created the office of the mayor, which was 
previously a collective executive body, and the city council, which had consisted of three 
chambers of the municipal assembly with up to one hundred and twenty delegates under the old 
law. The underlying goal of this system was to simplify the local governing process and to 
clearly draw the lines of responsibility among these actors.  Along with these changes, the 
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proportional voting system was introduced for local representatives, replacing the majority 
electoral system.  This applied only to the election of city council members, not to the election of 
mayors, who were still elected by majority vote (Todorovski 2001, 247).   
 
The new territorial organization was meant to bring government closer to the citizens, but this 
did not happen due to the inability of the local governments to manage the interests and problems 
of the citizenry.  A major problem of this law was the increase in the number of municipalities, 
which led to a significant increase in the number of municipalities with small populations.  As 
shown in Table 1, the majority of municipalities, 79 percent, had populations smaller than 20,000 
people.  These small municipalities were not sustainable in terms of demographic structure, 
economic viability, and organizational capacities.  The majority of the new municipalities also 
lacked the resources, primarily financial, to meet the problems they faced.  This was largely due 
to the lack of financial authority the municipalities had at this time.  This is illustrated by the low 
level of spending of Macedonian municipalities compared to their counterparts in other European 
Union countries.  In the 15 member states in 1998, local governments accounted for an average 
of 22 percent of general government expenditures, which is the equivalent of 9 percent of GDP.  
In contrast, Macedonian municipal spending accounted for 1.8 percent of general expenditures, 
the equivalent of less the 1 percent of GDP (Rafuse 2000, 3). 
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Table 5.1  Population of Municipalities after the 1996 Law on Territorial Division 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  UNDP 2004, 81 
 
The government of Macedonia signed and ratified the European Charter of Local Self-
Government on October 1, 1997.  The member states of the Council of Europe are required to 
sign and adopt the Charter, which binds them to guarantee the political, administrative and 
financial independence of local authorities.  It stipulates that the law of local self-government 
will be recognized in each country’s legislation and, where practicable, in the constitution.  The 
ratification of this Charter was an important step in the decentralization process and signaled the 
government’s commitment to it.  As a contracting state, Macedonia must provide the legal and 
Population No. of Municipalities Percent
0-1,000 5 4.1 
1,001-2,000 9 7.3 
2,001-5,000 33 26.8 
5,001-10,000 24 19.5 
10,001-20,000 26 21.1 
20,001-30,000 7 5.7 
30,001-40,000 4 3.3 
40,001-50,000 4 3.3 
50,001-100,000 9 7.3 
100,000+ 2 1.6 
Total 123 100 
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constitutional right and ability of municipalities to regulate and manage a substantial share of 
public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interest of the local population (European 
Charter for Local Self-Government, Article 3).  In fulfilling the principles of the Charter, the 
Ministry of Local Self-Government was established in 1999 as the lead central body to oversee 
the decentralization process and ensure the principles of the Charter and relevant legislation were 
followed.   
 
3. Local Self-Government Act, 2002 
The Ohrid Framework Agreement was adopted on August 13, 2001, to provide political and 
institutional solutions to the ethnic conflict that occurred between ethnic Albanians and the 
Macedonian government in that year.  The agreement came out of the political negotiations 
between the government and the four main political parties, as well as intense pressure from the 
international community.  The development of local self-government was one of the five basic 
principles of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.  It was seen as essential in “encouraging the 
participation of citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect of the identity of 
communities” (Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001, 1).  In this way, decentralization was 
identified as an important way to resolve the relative deprivation of the Albanian minority and to 
further the process of Euro-Atlantic integration with respect to reforming the political system 
(Institute for Regional and International Studies 2006, 9).  The agreement stipulated that that 
government adopt a revised law on local self-government within 45 days of signing the 
Framework agreement.   It called for a law that reinforced the powers of elected local officials 
and enlarged substantially their competencies in conformity with the Constitution and the 
European Charter on Local Self-Government. The agreement also outlined the enhanced 
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competencies in the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, 
local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health care 
(Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001, 1).   Ensuring the autonomy of the municipalities, the 
agreement specified that the new law ensure that any national standard or procedure established 
in any law that concerned an area that municipalities have independent competencies must be 
limited to those that cannot be accomplished effectively at the local level.  Out of this agreement 
was born the Local Self-Government Act in 2002.   
 
The Law on Local Self Government of 2002 broadly defines the responsibilities of the 
municipalities.  The law distinguishes between:  the general competency to perform activities of 
local importance, a list of specific competencies assigned to municipalities, and delegated 
competencies (Feruglio 2007, 9).  This new act shifted many competencies to the local 
municipalities and guaranteed them as primarily municipal responsibilities.  The idea behind this 
was to limit the authority of the central government and build the capacities of local self-
governments to counter-balance the power of the central government.  The competency to 
perform activities of local importance is, as a rule, comprehensive and exclusive, which allows 
municipalities to “independently regulate and perform activities of local importance within the 
legal framework” (Feruglio 2007, 10).  These competencies are full and exclusive and cannot be 
limited or taken away, except for cases specified in the law (UNDP 2004, 25).  The law also 
allows them to perform activities or duties that are not under the competency of the central 
government that are not explicitly laid out under the law.  As for the delegated competencies, the 
central government can transfer the execution of certain functions to the municipalities.  The 
delegation of these responsibilities is done taking into consideration the size of the municipality 
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in terms of population and land area, as well as the administrative capabilities in that particular 
area.  The central government finances the delegated responsibilities and holds the municipality 
accountable for the delivery of the service assigned to it (Feruglio 2007, 11). 
 
The competencies are carried out through bodies that are directly elected by the citizens, which 
are the Mayor and Municipal Council.  The Municipal Council is the legislative body while the 
Mayor is the head of the executive organ and the manager of the municipal staff.  It should be 
noted that under the Law on Civil Servants, the Secretary of the Municipality has managerial 
competencies over the staff as well (Feruglio 2007, 5).  The relationship between Mayor and 
Council is asymmetric in nature.  The council can only send proposals to the mayor but not hold 
him/her accountable for his/her acts.  The mayor, however, can suspend the enactment of a 
council resolution by rejecting it and sending it back to the council with his/her objections.  If the 
council overrules the mayor’s objections by a simple majority, the mayor has to promulgate it 
and has an option to appeal the decision to the Constitutional Court (Feruglio 2007, 5).      
 
The local governments have the right to establish local administrative departments and 
commissions according to local needs, which translates into significant organizational 
independence.  Municipalities also have a significant amount of flexibility in determining the 
modes of service delivery.  The municipalities are able to create municipal companies for public 
services or delegate the delivery to private companies (Feruglio 2007, 11).  Municipalities are 
also able to use inter-municipal cooperation agreements with neighboring municipalities to carry 
out services of a certain scale that the municipality can not do alone because of capacity or scale 
constraints.  The only control of the central government is in its ability to supervise the legality 
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of the operations of the municipalities but not on the substantive action of the local authorities 
(UNDP 2004, 28).  The responsible central authority has the right to appeal an alleged illegal 
decision to the Constitutional Court.  This is to ensure that the local governments’ decisions are 
in compliance with previous approvals or decisions of the competent state organ (Feruglio 2007, 
6).  In addition to those checks, the Ministry of Finance monitors the financial operations of the 
municipalities and the State Audit Office performs external audits of the municipalities.  The 
position of the mayor has also been strengthened by raising the position’s function to a 
professional level and making it illegal for the government to terminate the mandate of the 
mayor.  Another change that occurred with the adoption of this law was the ability of 
municipalities to set up associations in order to protect and promote shared interests, such as the 
Association of Local Self-Government Units (ZELS), as a counterbalance to the central 
government. 
 
The Municipal Council is responsible for the adoption of the municipal charter (statute), the 
approval of annual budgets, the establishment of public institutions and communal enterprises, 
the appointment of managers upon the mayor’s proposal, and the establishment of the 
municipality’s administrative organs.  The Mayor signs and proclaims the acts of the Council 
and is responsible for the implementation of the Council decisions, execution of the budget, and 
managing the municipal administration and its employees and property (Feruglio 2007, 5). 
 
The municipalities are responsible for creating administrative organs to perform specific 
administrative functions, such as a department of budgeting and accounting.  Because the 
municipalities create different administrative departments based on the needs of each 
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municipality, there is a high degree of diversity with respect to the organizational structure of the 
municipalities.  With the creation of new departments, and hence employment positions, there is 
a need for additional skills to perform the new competences assigned to the local governments.  
In order to fill the gaps in capacity and the need for exchange of information, coordination, and 
decision-making in the area of professional development and training of the employees of the 
municipal administrations, a Trilateral Committee for Coordination of Trainings was established.  
This committee harmonizes, coordinates, and decides upon all activities in the area of 
professional development and training in the municipal administrations (Feruglio 2007, 6). 
 
Prior to the adoption of the Local Self-Government Act of 2002, local governments still had 
competencies in a limited number of areas.  Under the 1995 Local Government Act, the only 
form of urban planning carried out by the local government was in authorizing the urban plans, 
which then had to be approved by the Ministry of Development (Yusufi 2006, 7).  The 2002 law 
transferred all urban and rural planning competencies to the local municipalities, allowing 
municipalities to have full control over the creation and adoption of plans.  The new law also 
transfers the issuance of building permits from the central government to the municipal 
governments.  The planning and management of local economic development initiatives is done 
by the appropriate local authorities, as are the protection of the environment and nature 
conservation.  The organization and management of communal infrastructure, such as water 
supply; the sewage system and wastewater treatment; construction and maintenance of local 
streets and roads; trash collection and treatment of solid waste; public transportation; gas and 
electricity supply; parks and recreation areas; regulation, maintenance and use of river banks in 
urban areas; and the naming of streets, squares, and other infrastructure objects, have become the 
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responsibility of local municipalities.  Institutional and financial support for cultural institutions 
and cultural events are also included in the competencies of municipalities (UNDP 2004, 29).  
Table 5.2  Competencies of Local Governments in Macedonia after 2002 
Urban and rural planning Urban planning, issuing of technical documentation for construction, and issuing of 
construction permits; regulation and maintenance of construction land. 
 
Environment Measures for protection and prevention of water, air, and land pollution, protection 
of nature, protection against noise and ionizing radiation. 
 
Local economic 
development 
 
Local economic development planning; determining of development and structural 
priorities; running of local economic policy; support of the development of small- 
and medium-size enterprises and entrepreneurship; participation in the establishment 
and development of local networks of institutions and agencies; and promotion of 
partnerships. 
 
Communal activities  
 
Water supply infrastructure; drainage and purification of waste water; public 
lighting; treatment of storm water; collection, transport, and treatment of communal 
solid and industrial waste; regulation and organization of local public transport; 
supply of natural gas and heating energy; maintenance of graves, cemeteries, and 
burial services; construction, maintenance, reconstruction, and protection of local 
roads, streets, and other infrastructure; regulation of traffic; construction and 
maintenance of traffic signals; construction and maintenance of public parking 
spaces; construction and maintenance of markets; maintenance and use of parks, 
green belts, and recreational spaces; regulation, maintenance of river beds in 
urbanized areas, determining names of streets, squares, bridges, and other 
infrastructure, etc. 
 
Sport and recreation  
 
Development of general sport and recreational activities of citizens; organization of 
sporting events; maintenance and construction of sport facilities of public interest for 
the municipality. 
Social welfare and child 
protection 
Kindergartens and homes for the elderly; social care for disabled persons, orphans, 
children with educational and social problems, children with special needs, children 
from single-parent families, persons exposed to social risk, persons with drug and 
alcohol addiction; raising of citizens’ awareness; housing of persons at social risk, 
sheltering and education of pre-school children. 
Education Establishing, financing, and administering primary and secondary schools, in 
cooperation with central government, in accordance with law; organizing 
transportation of students and their accommodation in dormitories. 
Supervision Supervision over the performance of activities under municipal competency. 
 
Delegated function Municipalities can also be tasked by a public administration body for the execution 
of certain tasks from its competency. 
Source: Law on Self-government, January 29, 2002, Official Gazette. No. 5/2002. Also online: 
http://www.zels.org.mk. (From Yusufi 2006, 7). 
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Since the adoption of the Law on Local Self Government, the Government of Macedonia has 
worked to better define the legal and regulatory framework needed to transfer the responsibilities 
assigned to the municipalities, as well as clarify the content of the competencies and the 
resources needed to do so.  The Operational Program for Decentralization of Powers (OPDP) 
was initiated in 2003 to outline the legislation and amendments required to guide the transfer of 
competencies.  A more detailed program called the Detailed Plan for Transfer of Competencies 
and Resources (DPTCR) in the Process of Decentralization was adopted in 2005 to examine 
more specifically the process of transferring the competencies (Feruglio 2007, 11).  Overall, ten 
laws and 47 by-laws had yet to be adopted as of December 2006.  
 
Table 5.3  Progress with the Legal and Regulatory Frameworks for Transferring Functions
 
Source:  Feruglio 2007, 12 
 
The major issue slowing the transfer of responsibilities to the municipalities is that developments 
in the legislative and regulatory frameworks have been done independently by the municipalities 
through the Official Gazette.  Further complicating this process is the fact that responsibilities 
Sector 
Identified in OPDP & DPTCR Identified by the Sub-groups 
Laws By-law Laws By-laws 
 Adopted Total Adopted Total Adopted Total Adopted Total 
Urban Planning 6 6 17 27 3 5 - - 
Local Econ. Development 4 5 1 4 4 7 3 3 
Culture 4 4 5 8 1 1 - - 
Education 3 3 5 16 - - - - 
Protection & rescue of  
citizens and goods 2 2 4 7 - - 39 39 
Environmental protection 4 5 21 29 0 2 - - 
Communal services 3 3 3 5 11 12 3 7 
Social & child protection 2 2 8 9 1 1 2 2 
Sport & recreation 1 1 1 3 - - - - 
Healthcare 2 2 - - - - - - 
Total 31 33 65 108 20 28 47 51 
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have been implemented without follow-up from the line ministries.  This has resulted in lower 
quality and poorer standards for monitoring, and is particularly more difficult for smaller 
municipalities, which are more likely to lack the tools to monitor and appropriately comply with 
the legislative changes (Feruglio 2007, 12).  
 
The Detailed Plan for Transfer of Competencies and Resources examined the transfer of 
institutions, employees, movable and immovable property, and documents to the municipalities 
in the respective areas of competence.  Most of the transfers have been completed.  However, 
some have not due to a complex set of reasons, including the existence of disputed ownership 
titles (Feruglio 2007, 13). 
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Table 5.4  Status of the Content of Transferred Competencies 
Sectors Content of the Transfer Transfer Status
Urban planning 
(regional branch offices 
of the Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communication) 
Decision-making authority; 
title of movable and 
immovable goods; 
employees; working 
means and documentation 
Over 280 employees, movable properties and 
documentation through individual agreements11 has been 
transferred. Title of immovable goods of the 34 regional 
units of the Ministry of Transport and Communication yet 
to be transferred due to disputed ownership rights. 
Local economic 
development 
Decision making authority  
Culture (institutions in 
culture such as 
museums, libraries, 
theatres and homes 
of culture) 
Decision-making 
authority; founding rights 
of the public institutions; 
title of immovable goods; 
employees; working 
means and documentation 
The founding rights have been transferred in 2004. A total 
of 48 institutions located in 28 municipalities out of which 
40 are municipal and 8 are of the City of Skopje. Title of 
immovable goods of 28 out of 48 institutions yet to be 
transferred due to disputed ownership titles. Contracts or 
individual agreements have been signed by 26 
municipalities and 3 are still to be signed. 
Education (dormitories 
for pupils; primary and 
secondary schools; 
transport for secondary 
school; area units of the 
Ministry of Education 
and Science) 
Decision-making authority, 
founding rights of the 
public institutions; title of 
immovable goods; 
employees; working means 
and documentation 
339 primary schools with around 18,505 employees, 
81secondary schools with 6,655 employees and 25 
dormitories have been transferred to the municipalities and 
the City of Skopje. This includes the title of immovable 
goods, equipment, inventory, archive, teaching equipment, 
documentation and other means. The transfer of the 
movable assets and real estate property of the regional units 
of the Ministry of Education and Science is ongoing 
Protection and rescue of 
citizens and goods 
(Territorial Fire-
Fighting Units) 
Decision-making authority, 
founding rights, title of 
immovable goods; 
employees; working means 
and documentation 
29 Territorial Fire-Fighting Units have been transferred 
only one has not been transferred. Title of immovable goods 
yet to be transferred due to disputed ownership titles. Out of 
715 employees 710 have been transferred. 
Environmental 
protection 
Decision-making authority  
Communal services Decision-making authority  
Social and child 
protection (child day 
care centers, elderly 
homes) 
Decision-making authority, 
founding rights of the 
public institutions; title of 
immovable goods; 
employees; working 
means and documentation 
Founding rights, 51 child day care centers with 3236 
employees transferred. Title of immovable goods of 33 
child day care centers yet to be transferred due to fully or 
partially disputed ownership titles. Founding rights, 3 out of 
4 elderly homes as well as the ownership title of movable 
assets and employees have been transferred. 
Sport and recreation 
(sport facilities) 
Decision-making authority, 
founding rights; title of 
immovable goods; 
employees; working means 
and documentation 
Right to use 9 buildings for sport and recreation transferred 
to the City of Skopje, 3 to the municipalities of the City of 
Skopje as well as 10 sport facilities to nine other 
municipalities 
Health care (Board of 
Directors and health 
prevention-vaccination) 
Decision-making authority  
Source:  Feruglio 2007, 13 
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The transfer of facilities, operating responsibilities, and personnel is an important feature of the 
process of transferring responsibilities.  The municipalities that did not have any of those 
facilities within their jurisdiction continue to be deprived or unfunded for the full exercise of the 
transferred functions.  This is due in many cases to the transfer of resources is earmarked for 
specific expenses in the existing facilities rather than local needs for specific services (Feruglio 
2007, 14).   
 
4.  Law on Territorial Organization of Local Self-Government, 2004 
From 1996 to 2004, there were 123 municipalities, plus the City of Skopje as a special unit of 
local self-government.  The number was decreased to 85 units with the adoption of the Law on 
Territorial Organization of Local Self-Government on August 11, 2004.  This law overturned the 
1996 law and reduced the number of municipalities with the idea that municipalities of a larger 
size and configuration would have sufficient capacity to raise their own revenue and that 
municipal services could be organized more efficiently (USAID website, retrieved 10/28/2006).  
It became apparent that the previous arrangement with such a large number of small 
municipalities was not sustainable.  The local self-governments are divided into three groups:  
City-municipalities; Village-municipalities; and Municipalities in the City of Skopje and the City 
of Skopje itself.  This last is treated as a special unit of local self-government as stipulated in the 
Law on the City of Skopje.  This reduction in the number of municipalities resulted in the 
merging of some of the old jurisdictions.  However, it did not terminate the work of the old 
offices of the previous units.  They continued to function as service centers dealing with the 
demands and complaints of local residents (Yusufi 2006, 7). 
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Table 5.5 Number of Municipalities before and after 2004 Law on Territorial Organization 
 
Type of Local 
Governments 
Number of Local 
Governments (2004) 
Number of Local 
Governments (1991-2004) 
City-municipalities 33 116 
Village-municipalities 41 n/a 
City of Skopje 
municipalities 
10 7 
City of Skopje 1 1 
Total 85 124 
   Note: A city, according to the country’s laws, has more than 3,000 residents (city-municipality). A village-municipality has fewer   
    than 3,000 residents. 
    Source:  Yusufi 2006, 8 
 
The changes made were not ushered in without problems.  The law changed the ethnic balance in 
several municipalities in favor of ethnic Albanians and was highly controversial.  The opposition 
party called for a referendum to annul the law and collected enough signatures to proceed with 
the referendum.  Although the referendum ultimately failed, it showed that the schedule of the 
implementation of decentralization was somewhat uncertain and that people were divided in 
respect to the referendum and the very idea of decentralization.  Had the referendum passed, it 
would have significantly set back the entire decentralization process.  Another serious issue with 
this law was that there was inadequate consultation of the municipalities in drafting this law, 
further reducing the support for it (Council of Europe 2007, 2).  
 
The Law on Local Self-Government of 2002 significantly increased municipal competencies.  
However, it did not fully address the issues of the imbalance in the distribution of competencies 
between the municipalities and the central government.  While this law contained a number of 
overall improvements, it did not radically alter the organization of local authorities (Council of 
Europe 2007, 4).  Insufficient finances, and technical and staff problems resulted in an 
incomplete decentralization of power (UNDP 2004, 82).  Many of the municipalities still lacked 
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the financial capacity to carry out their new competencies.  Another issue that was not properly 
addressed in the new legislation was citizen participation in the political process.  Since 
independence, citizen participation had always been limited in Macedonia.  The citizens lacked 
understanding of how the local government worked and what services were provided, which was 
due to the complex instruments that were available for citizen participation.  An example is the 
referendum with a requirement of at least 20 percent of the voters and a citizen initiative that 
required at least ten percent.  The 2002 Law on Local Self-Government did little to change this 
and only gave citizens the right to submit suggestions about the work of their local governments 
(UNDP 2005, 134). 
 
While the Law on Self-government drafted in January 2002 precipitated several changes in the 
fiscal power of the municipalities, it did not go far enough in providing the municipalities with 
adequate financial autonomy.  A new decentralization reform package that was part of the 
Territorial Organization Law from 2004, along with other reforms that were initiated by the 
Ministry of Local Self-government, was formally launched on July 1, 2005.  These new reforms 
increased the speed of decentralization.  The reforms consisted of three main processes:  the 
transfer of a new set of competencies from the central to the local level, the transfer of civil 
servants and other state employees from central to local institutions, and the transfer of funds to 
overcome the unfavorable conditions for decentralization and equalization in Macedonia (Yusufi 
2006, 5).  These adopted reforms were made in order to overcome the deficiencies of the 
previous legal framework.   
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In the new system, the general competencies of local governments are ensured under the 
principle of subsidiarity, which is the right for municipalities to perform activities of local 
importance on their territory that are not excluded from their competency or are not under the 
competency of the organs of the state administration.  Municipalities have the right to regulate 
and perform activities of local importance independently.  The competencies are, by law, 
comprehensive and exclusive and cannot be taken away or limited.  Local self-government is a 
constitutional right recognized by the Constitution of Macedonia.  The new competencies were 
transferred to the 85 municipalities after the local elections, held in March 2005 (Yusufi 2006, 
6). 
 
The Law on Financing Units of Local Self-government from 2004 gives the right to the 
municipal council, as well as the mayor, to bring a case before the Constitutional Court as to the 
constitutionality of a law, as well as the constitutionality and legality of the acts of ministries and 
other state bodies in which the constitutional position and the rights of the municipality may be 
infringed (Yusufi 2006, 8).  This financial autonomy of the local governments mainly covers 
issues such as budgeting, expenditure, revenue raising, property ownership, and borrowing. 
 
5. Law on Financing the Units of Local Self-government, 2004 
 
There were numerous shortcomings with the previous finance system in Macedonia.  Under that 
system, there was no possibility for local self-government units to be funded by the revenues 
from local fees and taxes according to what each municipality deemed to be appropriate.  There 
were limited discretionary rights for local self-government units to establish spending policy 
within their competency because the funds allocated by the state were for specific uses only.  
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Before the law took effect, resources administered by municipalities represented less than two 
percent of total public expenditures (Channel Research 2007, 3).  This, along with the delays in 
state transfers, left the municipalities unable to perform even some of their most basic legal 
obligations.  Another issue was that municipalities had difficulty accessing the national capital 
market.  Even more problematic was the fact that there was no consultation or coordination from 
the state bodies and agencies that were responsible for distributing funds to finance projects at 
the local government level (Yusufi 2006, 9).  Additionally, there was no framework legislation 
governing municipal finances in the country.  Instead, the rules governing the revenues, the 
formation and execution of the municipal budgets, as well as their financial reporting 
obligations, were set by a wide number of laws and ordinances that were decided annually by the 
central government (Yusufi 2006, 9). 
 
A local public financing system was developed with the adoption of the Law on Financing Units 
of Local Self-government in 2004, which enabled a high level of financial independence that was 
not present under any of the previous systems.  The new system amended the laws that 
previously limited the sources of funding for the municipalities that were from the Law on Local 
Self-government of 1995.  As is required in any decentralized system of government, it balanced 
the sources of financing with the actual needs of the municipalities.  Additionally, this legal 
framework supported a far more transparent system of financial balancing of the local self-
government units by establishing a set of clearly defined criteria to decide on the financial 
scheme of the municipality.  The new law strengthened the discretionary rights of the 
municipalities to allocate funds in the framework units responsible for the setting and execution 
of the budget (Yusufi 2006,  10).  Municipalities are able to finance themselves through their 
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own and other sources of financing.  The own source revenues that are available to 
municipalities are local taxes, charges, and fees determined by law.  The municipality, within the 
framework determined by law, is to define the level of tax rate and the level of charges and fees 
of its own source revenues.  Grants from the state are also available, and municipalities can 
borrow from the domestic and foreign capital markets as well.  Municipalities are, within their 
designated competencies, able to use their own source revenues according to their own needs, 
independent of the central government. 
 
This law also introduced new requirements for the staff of the local governments’ 
administrations.  A commission to monitor the decentralization process as it pertains to the 
system of intergovernmental finance was set u  This commission is responsible for monitoring 
the implementation of the criteria for the central government transfers and to provide 
recommendations for improving the system.  This commission ensures the system is transparent 
and will provide recommendations for the formula for transferring the grants from the value-
added tax and about methods for the distribution of grants from the central government.  The 
commission is comprised of representatives from the ministries responsible for local self-
government, finance, science and education, and labor and social policy, and representatives 
from the Association of Local Self-Governments (ZELS) (UNDP 2005, 134). 
 
1. Budgeting 
 
Prior to the reforms initiated in 2004, the preparation of local budgets was done in close 
coordination with the preparation of the general budget of the state.  With the Law on Budgets of 
1993, the local self-governments’ budgets were prepared and adopted using the same procedures 
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and guidelines assigned to the central government budget.  During the period that this law was in 
effect, local governments did not have control over a consolidated budget.  Instead, municipal 
budgets were composed of an administrative budget and a number of off-budget funds that 
sometimes were referred to as programs (Yusufi 2006, 8).  With the recent reforms, a 
municipality has greater independence to prepare and execute its own municipal budget.  If the 
revenues and expenditures are not completed as planned by the municipal budget within the 
fiscal year, the mayor has the ability to propose that the council change and amend the budget, 
which is a power not previously granted to the municipality. 
 
2. Spending Autonomy 
 
Before reform, local governments did not have the autonomy to decide on spending their own 
source revenues that were capped at a level decided by the central government.  The Law on 
Caps of Own Revenues of Units of Local Self-government limited the already scarce revenues of 
the municipalities.  With recent reforms, municipalities are now able to allocate their own source 
revenues as they see fit, independent of any state interference, so long as it is within its 
competencies laid out by law.  The municipality may decide autonomously about the use of its 
own revenues, as well as revenues from shared taxes such as the personal income tax (Yusufi 
2006, 8).  As a share of GDP, local expenditures nearly doubled from 1.37 percent in 2002 to 
2.43 percent in 2006.  It is worth noting that while this is an improvement, local public 
expenditures remain quite low by international standards.  As a share of total government 
expenditures, in 2006 local expenditures accounted for less than seven percent compared to the 
26 percent average for all other transitional countries (Feruglio 2007, 14). 
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It should be pointed out that local governments operate through four different accounts: the 
principal budget, the budget of donations, the budget of earmarked grants, and the budget of self-
financing activities.  Local authorities have full discretion for the allocation of money from the 
principal budget only.  The donation budget is restricted by the terms of the donation agreement, 
and the earmarked grants can only be used according to the plans of the institution receiving the 
funds and must be approved by line ministries.  According to data from the Ministry of Finance, 
the principal budgets of all the municipalities represented 70 percent of local expenditures.  This 
means that local authorities have total discretion of 70 percent of the total expenditures (Feruglio 
2007, 16).  
 
Table 5.6  Composition of Local Expenditures by Program in 2006 (% of total) 
Program Principal 
budget 
Donations Self-
financing 
Earmarked 
Grants 
Total 
General public services 26.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 26.6 
Fire protection 0.2 0.0 0.0 3.4 3.6 
Economic affairs 
 
30.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 30.5 
Arranging of 
construction land 
7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 
Maintenance of 
local roads & 
streets
5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Construction and 
rehabilitation of 
local roads 
12.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.7 
Environmental services 3.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.5 
Housing and 
community amenities 
7.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4 
Recreation, culture, and 
religion 
1.1 0.1 0.5 0.7 2.5 
Education 0.8 0.1 7.2 11.5 19.6 
Social protection 0.0 0.0 3.4 1.9 5.4 
Other 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 
Total 70.8 0.6 11.2 17.5 100.0 
Source:  Feruglio 2007, 17 
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3. Borrowing 
 
Prior to the reforms, municipalities were able to borrow as needed.  However, they were limited 
to the funds of the general budget of the country and to the domestic market.  After the reforms, 
the municipality has the right to borrow from foreign capital markets.  However, the central 
government is still able to exert some influence in that the municipality is only able to borrow 
from foreign entities with prior consent from the central government (Yusufi 2006, 9).  The 
municipality can take out short-term loans, which must be repaid by the end of the fiscal year; 
and may be used for covering the municipalities’ temporary cash deficits, but not for the paying 
of fines and any penalty interest.  The total amount of this short-term borrowing cannot exceed 
20 percent of the overall revenues from the current operational budget of the municipality from 
the previous year (Yusufi 2006, 9).  The municipality is also autonomous in terms of long-term 
borrowing for the financing of capital assets or investment projects, but with the stipulation that 
repayment be made in equal or decreasing annuities.  The municipal council approves the 
proposed long-term borrowing only after a public hearing has taken place.  The decision reached 
by the council shall be valid only if the agreement for borrowing is concluded in the same fiscal 
year of reaching the decision.  The total amount of the annual debt-service from long-term 
borrowing in one fiscal year can amount up to 15 percent of the overall revenues in the current 
operational budget of the municipality from the previous fiscal year (Yusufi 2006, 9). 
 
4. Revenue Raising 
 
Prior to recent reforms, local governments’ independent collection of public revenues was 
limited.  Most revenues were collected by the regional branches of the public revenue office of 
the Ministry of Finance, paid to the account of the central budget, and then the funds were 
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distributed to the local governments according to predefined criteria (Yusufi 2006, 8).  After 
recent reforms, municipalities’ administrations were given the responsibility of calculating and 
collecting their own revenues.  The municipality is also able to define the level of tax rates and 
the level of charges and fees (Yusufi 2006, 8).  In order to ensure that the municipalities carry 
out this responsibility in an efficient manner, the municipalities will take on employees from the 
Public Revenues Office and the Department of Common and Financial Affairs of the Ministry of 
Finance to perform these newly acquired taxation and revenue competencies. 
 
Composition of Local Government Revenues 
 
 
Under the old system, revenues from a limited number of sources were available to 
municipalities.  The taxes that municipalities could collect were: the property tax; the tax on 
inheritance and gifts; and the tax on the transfer of immovable property and rights.  They were 
also able to collect fees, charges, and other revenues.  These were the land fee (construction site 
utilization charge); communal fee (construction site arrangement charge); property revenue, etc.; 
and earnings from public enterprises founded by the local self-government unit (charges for 
providing local services/local public transportation, water supply, sewerage, waste disposal, etc.).  
There were also funds available from various state bodies or agencies, donations from domestic 
and foreign sources (in goods and money), and local contributions both in manpower and 
financial resources (Yusufi 2006, 10). 
 
Local self-government units in Macedonia were extremely under-funded with these sources of 
revenues and essentially had no own revenue raising authority or spending powers.  There were 
massive vertical imbalances between the central government and local governments, as well as 
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horizontal imbalances between the local governments themselves.  The vertical imbalances that 
existed were characterized by the large amount of debt the municipalities owed to the suppliers 
of goods and services, amounting to around MKD three billion (US$60 million). Additionally, 
the local government expenditures made up only 1.7 percent of GDP in 2003, compared to the 
central government’s GDP expenditures of 21.3 percent (Yusufi 2006, 10).  This illustrated the 
highly centralized fiscal system in Macedonia at that time.  The high fiscal dependency of local 
governments on central government was also further illustrated by the high dependency of local 
governments on various central government sources of revenues.  According to figures from 
2001, 67 percent of the municipal revenues were derived directly from the national government 
(Yusufi 2006, 10).  The horizontal imbalance was characterized by the high share of local 
governments with per capita revenues well below the national average.  In 2003, 41 local 
governments, representing 36 percent of Macedonia’s population, had per capita incomes of less 
than 50 percent of the national average (Yusufi 2006, 10).  In 2002, 88 municipalities, which 
make up 72 percent of the total number of municipalities, accounted for less than 40 percent of 
the total expenditures of that year for municipalities (Yusufi 2006, 10). 
 
Under the old system, the Public Revenue Offices of the Ministry of Finance, which were 
regional branches of the central government, were responsible for administering the local tax 
revenue (property tax, inheritance and gift tax, and tax on real estate and rights transactions) and 
collecting the revenues (Feruglio 2007, 22).  However, the collection was poor since the highest-
quality revenue sources were economic activity-related taxes (VAT, personal income tax), which 
were available only to central authorities.  This contributed to the inefficient financial system of 
local self-governments (Yusufi 2006, 10).  These public revenue offices also suffered from poor 
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collection rates that increased the horizontal and vertical imbalances under this system.  In 2000, 
20 out of 30 local units of public revenue offices collected fewer taxes than the average 
collection rate (Yusufi 2006, 10).  There were also severe problems in the distribution of local 
revenues.  The funds were distributed to the municipalities in accordance with defined criteria.  
This frequently left the municipalities being not well informed as to the amount of money 
collected from the various sources of revenue that would serve their needs (Feruglio 2007, 22).  
A pilot project was undertaken in 2004 in four cities (Gostivar, Struga, Sveti Nikole, and Veles) 
to test the ability of these municipalities to collect certain revenues.  The project was a test for 
devolving the administration of property taxes to the local municipalities.  The project results 
showed a 41percent increase in the property tax collection rate.  The collection rate of the 
property transfer tax increased by 195 percent (Yusufi 2006, 11). 
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  Figure 5.2  Local Revenues as a Percent of GDP: 2002-2006 
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  Source:  Feruglio 2007, 23 (based on Ministry of Finance data) 
 
All sources of own source revenue increased for the municipalities between 2004 and 2006 
except for communal fees and charges, which are dominated by revenue from construction 
permit fees (Feruglio 2007, 23).  This is due to the delay in the approval of local master plans by 
the Ministry of Transport, which resulted in a backlog of building permit applications since 
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municipalities cannot issue them without an approved master plan by the Ministry of Transport 
(Feruglio 2007, 23).  Between 2005 and 2006, all three property related taxes increased as a 
percent of GDP, especially the real estate transfer tax which increased from 0.24 percent to 0.35 
percent (Feruglio 2007, 25).   
 
         Table 5.7 Yield of Local Revenue Instruments in 2003-2006 (% of GDP) 
 
Type of Revenue 2003 2004 2006 
Income tax - - 0.07 
Property taxes 0.26 0.26 0.42 
Communal fees and charges 0.89 0.94 0.58 
Administrative fees and charges 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Service fees 0.01 0.05 0.29 
out of which: 
Collected by schools and child day care centers - - 0.26 
Other government services 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Other non-tax revenues 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Sales of capital assets 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Sale of land and non-material assets 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Foreign donations 0.02 0.01 0.09 
Total 1.24 1.35 1.57 
Source:  Feruglio 2007, 24 (based on Ministry of Finance data) 
 
 
Beginning in July 2005, the new system of financing was initiated that followed the adoption of 
new Law on Financing the Units of Local Self-Government from 2004.  The sources of financing 
for municipalities were extended and now include:  shared taxes, own sources of revenue, 
transfers of funds from the budget of the republic and budgets of the state funds, and borrowing.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  79
         Figure 5.3 Revenue Performance of Major Local Taxes as Percent of GDP: 2005-2006 
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  Source:  Feruglio 2007, 25 (based on ZELS data) 
 
Shared taxes 
 
As a shared tax, the Personal Income Tax (PIT) was to be a major new source of revenue for 
local governments.  In this case, the municipalities were to receive revenues from the personal 
income tax collected in that year.  Revenues from personal income tax were to be distributed to 
the municipalities according to the following criteria:  three percent of the personal income tax 
from salaries of persons collected in the municipality where they are registered with a permanent 
residence; and 100 percent from the personal income tax from physical persons who are 
performing craft activity, registered in the territory of the municipality in accordance with the 
Law on Craft Activity (Feruglio 2007, 31).  In total, the amount collected from the personal 
income tax amounts to about MKD 180 million (US$3.6 million) , or about four percent of the 
total revenues of local governments in 2003 (Yusufi 2006, 10). 
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Own Taxes/Sources 
 
According to the Law on Financing the Units of Local Self-Government (Article 4-7) and 
subsequent legislation, municipalities are entitled collect revenues from the following sources: 
 
1. Property taxes (annual property tax, tax on transfer of real estate, tax on inheritance and 
gifts); 
2. Local fees (communal fees, administrative fees); 
3. Communal charges (construction land charges, communal activity charges, spatial 
planning charges); 
4. Revenues from assets (leasing, interest, property sales); 
5. Financial donations (a contract between the donor and the mayor after approval from the 
municipal council); 
6. Fines 
7. Self contributions (authorized through local referendum); and 
8. Revenues from concessions on mineral resources (Feruglio 2007, 26). 
 
 
Municipalities are fully responsible for collecting property taxes, which makes them responsible 
for property identification, property valuation, preparing and issuing of tax bills, collection, 
accounting, enforcement, and the initial review of appeals (Feruglio 2007, 27).  The Law on 
Property Taxes gives the municipalities discretion in setting the property tax rate, which must be 
between 0.10 percent and a maximum of 0.20 percent of the market value of the property.   
 
The tax on the transfer of real estate is essentially a sales tax on real estate transactions. This tax 
on property transfers has been a more productive source of revenues than the property tax, 
yielding 0.35% of GDP compared to 0.06% for the annual property tax (Feruglio 2007, 29).   
 
Another important source of revenue for municipalities is charges and fees for various activities.  
Among those listed in the table above, the construction permit fee is the most significant of all 
municipal own source revenues.  On average it accounts for 20 percent of local budget revenues 
nationwide.  It should be noted that in the capital Skopje, the fees on construction of land 
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account for 40 to 50 percent of the total local revenues.  In other urban municipalities that 
number is less than 25 percent, while in rural municipalities it is less than 15 percent (Feruglio 
2007, 30).  This can largely be attributed to two things. First, most construction occurs in the 
cities, so the smaller and more rural municipalities do not have access to this type of revenue.  
Secondly, it can be attributed to the fact that smaller municipalities do not have urban plans that 
have been adopted or approved by the central government, without which they cannot issue 
construction permits (Feruglio 2007, 30).   
 
Transfers from the Central Budget 
Grants were made available from the central government to provide additional revenue meant to 
improve the performance of the competencies of the local governments determined by law.  
Grants from the budget of the Government of Macedonia and budgets of special funds provided 
additional revenue for the municipalities to finance their competencies.  The goal of these grants 
was to assist in the equalization of the financial situation among the municipalities (Yusufi 2006, 
11).  The following are types of grants that could be allocated from the budget of the 
Government of Macedonia:  
 Earmarked grants:  used for financing a special activity.  The line-ministries and 
funds office propose to the Ministry of Finance the distribution of the earmarked 
grants per municipality, project, institution, and/or program with a budget calculation 
for the following year.  The line ministries and the funds office monitor the execution 
of the earmarked grant.  A line ministry manages a particular grant under its 
authority. 
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 Capital grants:  The capital grant, on the basis of the program determined by the 
government, is used for financing investment projects. The line-ministries and the 
funds office, in their distribution of the capital grants, give priority to projects that 
previously have collected the necessary funds and to projects that have been started 
but not completed. The line ministries and the funds office control the execution of 
the capital grant. This includes the Ministries of Transport and Communication, 
Environment, and special funds, including the Fund for Economically 
Underdeveloped Regions and the Fund for Regional Roads. 
 Block grants:  are used for financing through concrete programs the competencies of 
the local self-governments in the fields of culture, social welfare and child protection, 
education, and healthcare. 
 Grants for delegated competency:  The grant for delegated competency is used to 
finance a delegated competency of a mayor’s central state management function.  The 
funds for the delegated competency are provided from the amount set in the budget of 
the republic for the line-state management body.  The minister who manages the state 
administration body and the mayor of the municipality conclude an agreement for the 
regulation of mutual relations regarding the grant for delegated competency (Yusufi 
2006, 12). 
 
Equalization Measures 
 
 
Prior to the adoption of the Law on Financing of Local Self-government in August 2004, and its 
implementation in mid-2005, there were no instruments to equalize the financial situation of 
local governments.  There were transfers and funds not formally designed for equalization 
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purposes but used for such purposes.   These funds were earmarked for investments in 
infrastructure; however, the municipalities had no control as to how they would be utilized 
(Yusufi 2006, 12).  Most of these transfers were distributed through the Bureau for Economically 
Underdeveloped Regions.  Other programs that transferred funds to the municipalities were:  The 
Fund for Roads, The Water Supply Program, The Physical and Urban Planning Program, The 
Program for Revitalization of Rural Areas, The Rural Areas Electrification Program, and projects 
funded from the sale of the Macedonian Telecommunications Company (Yusufi 2006, 12). 
 
Because of insufficient funds and the lack of objective criteria in the distribution and allocation 
of these funds, the transfers did not create a properly functioning equalization system (Yusufi 
2006, 12).  One problem with this arrangement was that there were no objective criteria set for 
the priority allocation of funds.  There were also complaints by mayors and council members that 
party interests heavily influenced the decisions.  There was a high level of central government 
discretion, mainly political, in the transfer of funds to municipalities.  Only the Road Fund 
transfers were made according to the defined quantitative formula (Yusufi 2006, 12).  In sum, 
mismanagement and lack of objective criteria in the transfer of funds dominated the financial 
equalization system in Macedonia.  The method of transfers did not include standards for the 
minimum acceptable levels of expenditure for municipalities.  It was essentially a mechanism for 
donating funds to the municipalities that had no fiscal or administrative capacity to generate their 
planned budget revenues (Yusufi 2006, 12).  There was no clear link between the levels of the 
municipalities’ own revenues per capita and transfers per capita.  This did not remove horizontal 
disparities, which resulted from the allocation of funds not being based on acceptable standards 
for provision of public services, and the methods did not take into account municipal fiscal 
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capacities (Yusufi 2006, 13).  This system of transfers from the central government to 
municipalities suffered from the problems typically faced by developing countries that lack 
sound fiscal equalization mechanisms.  As is often the case, large municipalities received the 
largest share of transfers from the central government.  However, there were also instances of 
smaller municipalities receiving resources that were well beyond their fiscal needs (Yusufi 206, 
13).  The funds were generally transferred on the basis of political and personal connections of 
the mayors.  Municipalities were, therefore, significantly dependent on the central government, 
which was especially true for rural municipalities.  These transfers to rural and poorer urban 
municipalities did not result in any equalization of the financial status between municipalities 
(Yusufi 2006, 13). 
 
A capping system was in place that allowed the government to pass laws that limited the 
expenditures of municipalities by imposing a cap on the amount of shared taxes, primarily the 
property tax, which could be allocated to the administrative budgets of the municipalities (Yusufi 
2006, 13).  The rates for all taxes, fees, and charges were set by the national government.  In 
addition nearly, all were collected by the government’s public revenue offices (Yusufi 2006, 13).  
With the cap system, the Ministry of Finance distributed the funds that were collected from the 
taxes of the local governments based on criteria that utilized a system of 80:10:10, whereby the 
first number was population of the municipality, the second the number of inhabited settlements, 
and lastly the area in square kilometers of the municipality (Yusufi 2006, 13).  This applied only 
to revenues of the administrative budget of local governments, which covered all items relating 
to the operation of the local governments’ staff (Yusufi 2006, 13).  The cap system meant that 
the regionally collected shared taxes were redistributed back to local governments within the 
region on the basis of the 80:10:10 formula until they reached their caps, at which point any 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  85
surplus became property of the national government (Yusufi 2006, 13).  The government did 
redistribute most of the surplus back to local governments once or twice a year, but on an ad hoc 
basis. 
 
With the adoption of the Law on Financing Units of Local Self-government in 2004, the only 
newly defined equalization instrument is the revenue that is transferred from the value added tax 
(VAT).  For the City of Skopje and the other municipalities in the City of Skopje, a joint fund 
has been created for the purposes of equalization.  This is funded by the revenues generated from 
the personal income tax, communal tax for company title, communal street tax for passenger, 
cargo and auxiliary vehicles, and other means (Yusufi 2006, 14).  Although not explicitly 
mentioned, block grants are available to be used by the national government to equalize the 
financial situation of local governments (Yusufi 2006, 14).  New reforms have eliminated the 
caps system on the revenue that local governments receive from shared property taxes and 
communal fees and with it the redistribution of the surplus.  The same taxes and fees are 
becoming the true own-source revenues of local governments.  In the new system, local 
governments are responsible for setting the rates of the property tax, the property transfer tax, 
and the gifts and inheritance tax, as well as for communal fees and charges like the hotel charge 
and the sign fee (Yusufi 2006, 14).  Also significant is that responsibility for maintaining tax 
rolls, cadastres, and collections are to be transferred from the Public Revenue Offices to local 
governments.  The new reforms in the system of intergovernmental transfers reflect the 
formation of a genuine financial equalization system (Yusufi 2006, 14).  This requires resolving 
the basic issue of a transfer allocation mechanism.  Regarding the distribution of transfers, the 
system should be objective and transparent, i.e., using a formula to determine the amount of 
funds to be received by each individual municipality (Yusufi 2006, 14).  Also, the total transfer 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  86
amount should be defined in advance, to avoid ad hoc decisions that might jeopardize overall 
fiscal discipline (Yusufi 2006, 14). 
 
The value-added tax (VAT) is used as an equalizing tool in financing local governments.  The 
new regulations provide that three percent of all VAT revenues collected nationwide from the 
previous fiscal year will be distributed to the municipalities.  The distribution of the revenue 
from taxes is to be executed according to the criteria per capita and other criteria defined by an 
ordinance on the distribution of revenues from VAT enacted by the national government in the 
Ministry of Finance (Yusufi 2006, 14).  The City of Skopje is a special case, with different 
criteria to determine the method to correct the differences between the City of Skopje and the 
other municipalities.  With the Joint Fund for the City of Skopje and the municipalities in the 
City of Skopje, revenues are distributed in accordance with the methods approved by the Minster 
of Finance (Yusufi 2006, 14).  In 2003, the revenues from the VAT that were available to 
municipalities, which is the three percent of total VAT, totaled MKD 700 million (US$14 
million), or about 16 percent of total revenues of the sector (Yusufi 2006,  14).  With this three 
percent share of the VAT, local governments increased their revenues by 30 percent on an 
aggregate level. 
 
There remains, however, a serious problem in the area of transferring land that is held by the 
central government to the municipalities.  The process requires the municipalities to apply for 
each parcel of land they wish to acquire.  Due to inefficiencies and an interest on the part of 
those in certain segments of the central government to keep these transfers from happening, the 
applications get held in the review process for extended periods of time, in some cases for 
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several years.  This has been detrimental to the decentralization process as municipalities have 
lost countless opportunities for investment because they could not secure the land in order to 
finalize the sale of the property.   
 
Within these changes, there has been a focus on capacity-building in the municipalities’ offices 
in order to enable them to properly assume the new responsibilities.  The new program has 
approved an operational program for decentralization of power, created a coordinating body for 
decentralization consisting of the secretaries from all ministries, created a decentralization 
working group made up of representatives from all ministries, signed a memorandum of 
cooperation with the Association of Local Self-Governments (ZELS), and adopted a 
communication strategy for the decentralization process and coordinated trainings for the Local 
Self-Government administration.  Although these are significant steps, the process is still moving 
forward slowly (UNDP 2005, 130). 
 
Further delaying the decentralization process is the fact that a large number of competencies that 
were to be transferred to the local governments under the 2002 law still remain in the central 
government.  The following functions have yet to be devolved and show the ministries that are 
still responsible for them:  libraries, monuments and memorials, museums, art centers (Ministry 
of Culture); primary and high schools, student standards (Ministry of Education); street names, 
management of traffic, construction and urban planning (Ministry of Transport and 
Communication); tourism, crafts and trade (Ministry of Economy); primary healthcare, 
protection of contagious diseases (Ministry of Health); financing of municipalities, devolution of 
property tax responsibility and local fees and charges (Ministry of Finance); protection of 
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children and elderly (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy); protection of environment and nature, 
waste management, water management, air quality, spatial and urban planning (Ministry of 
Environment and Urban Planning); and firefighting (Ministry of Interior).  It should be 
understood that in some of these areas, certain aspects of these functions have been transferred to 
the local governments, but not nearly all of them that should have been under the law (UNDP 
2005, 136). 
 
Even in areas where the local municipalities have assumed some of the responsibilities given to 
them by law, they are often limited to “municipal housekeeping,” meaning communal services.  
This is due to the fact that the line ministries have not completed the devolution of the designated 
functions to the local level (UNDP 2005, 136).  Many of the problems that have been associated 
with communal enterprise still remain as a result of the lack of capacity to handle these 
responsibilities.  There are other problems as well, such as a lack of price uniformity for services 
provided that are not due to differences in cost of production.  This is largely due to the failure of 
communal enterprises to collect fees.  Nationwide, the average collection rate for communal fees 
is 54 percent, and even if they did collect 100 percent, communal enterprises would not recover 
costs because of the low level of fees charged (UNDP 2005, 137).  This could be due to the lack 
of collection and enforcement powers that plagues the country in nearly all areas of government, 
and the low incomes of the majority of the population that renders them unable to pay for such 
services.  Another factor complicating matters is that communal enterprises suffer from an 
organizational culture focused on revenue collection as way to provide salaries that does not 
foster a desire to increase efficiency and improve the quality of services.   A recent survey done 
by the Economic Institute of Skopje found that only 65 percent of citizens benefited from water 
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supply services, and 25 percent of citizens benefited from services such as solid waste 
management and green areas (UNDP 2005, 136).  The same study concluded that this is 
attributed to the infrastructure of communal enterprises being obsolete, dating back to the 1950s.  
In most communities, water loss was estimated to be between thirty and fifty percent due to the 
poor condition of the water supply infrastructure.  The problem continues because financing of 
enterprises comes from municipalities’ own expenses, roughly ninety percent of the costs and the 
rest is provided from loans and grants.  Municipalities are unable to sufficiently cover these costs 
because of the budget limitations put on them by the current system and the low levels of 
economic activity in the majority of the municipalities that would otherwise generate revenues 
from taxes.  Highlighting this fact is the low level of expenditures of municipalities, which is 
only 1.38 percent of total GDP (UNDP 2005, 137).  The majority of these expenditures are not 
put to upgrading and maintaining infrastructure and service provision, as a good share of this 
goes towards wages, averaging 45 percent nationwide and in some municipalities it is nearly 100 
percent.  This is emblematic of the wide disparity in expenditures among municipalities, which is 
reflected in the fact that the poorest municipalities spend three dollars per capita on these 
services, while the richest spend over one hundred (UNDP 2005, 138).  This demonstrates a need 
for an equalization system and a more balanced economic development program.  
 
Key Informant Interviews 
Dr. Jan Herczyski, Warsaw University 
Dr. Jan Herczyski stated that there is no doubt that the responsibilities of the local governments 
in the Republic of Macedonia have been significantly strengthened, especially in the second 
phase of decentralization. According to Dr. Herczyski, the central government has transferred 
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the responsibilities to the municipalities as outlined in the legislation and that the laws have been 
fully implemented.  In regard to any resistance that exists within the government to transfer 
responsibilities, it is his opinion that while central government authorities and politicians do not 
represent a uniform block, the main resistance comes from some Macedonian politicians, who 
are supported by the frustrated ethnic Macedonian population.  
 
Dr. Jan Herczyski feels that the municipal departments are free from direct central 
interventions. However, the central government has the right, and often uses it, to not give 
approval to some local policies (such as closure of small schools). That being said, in every 
country, the central government has the right and responsibility to define overall policies and 
monitor how they are implemented.  There is a political process through which the central 
government monitors and may annul some decisions by the local governments, but this is 
prescribed by the law.  There are legally prescribed limits on central government interventions in 
local policies (environment, building safety, access to education, etc.).   Dr. Herczynski is aware 
of a few delays on the part of the central government in regards to education, but feels they are 
not significant. 
 
Regarding the capacity of local staff to perform the duties transferred to them, Dr. Herczynski 
believes that it is much better for the municipalities to train and advance their own staff rather 
than rely on the staff transferred to them from the central government.  The central government 
has transferred staff to the municipalities as prescribed in the law.  He is aware of some cases 
where the transferred staff was less than 100 percent professional. However, training new staff is 
a long process, and finding quality staff is hampered by low salaries.   He feels the lack of 
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managerial and technical skills that exists at the municipal level as a long term problem.  He 
believes that the local staff can only learn by doing, and the learning process has already started. 
That said, there are many opportunities to train them, but these opportunities are mostly 
organized by donor institutions and tend to be of rather low quality or relevance.  Dr. Herczyski 
states that there have been some investments in the offices and technology in the municipalities 
and does not think that this is a major barrier now.  
 
According to Dr. Herczyski, the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement has gone 
quite well, especially in the area of education.  In his view, the international community was 
offering its sometimes heavy-handed assistance to the Macedonian government from the signing 
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, without waiting for the Macedonians to seek it. The 
interference of the EU and the US in local political process was quite marked.  
 
The main purpose of the Law on Territorial Organization was to consolidate the smallest 
jurisdictions. This goal was not fully achieved because of the ethnic factor, with the 
consolidation of municipalities resulting in a number of municipalities that changed the majority 
population from Macedonian to Albanian, which was resisted by much of the Macedonian 
population. There are still too many small municipalities that are unable to deliver adequate and 
efficient education, but the barriers and distrust are too deep for this to be changed.  
   
There is a problem with assigning a single scope of functions to all municipalities that risks 
substandard provision of functions in some localities while failing to utilize capacity in others.  
However, taking some functions from some municipalities and transferring them to larger ones, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  92
such as to the cities, opens an even more difficult and conflict-ridden process than the 
Macedonian democracy is able to address now.  
 
The problem with inter-municipal cooperation is not the lack of adequate opportunities, which 
does exist, but with the unwillingness of neighbors to share tasks and funds, especially when 
different ethnic communities are involved. He sees this problem of inter-municipal cooperation 
as a “dead end,” which is a problem in countries with a homogonous population like Poland.   
 
He feels that the issue of information sharing between the central government and the 
municipalities is governed by laws, and the reporting obligations of local governments are quite 
significant. The transparency and openness of the central government, however, is a serious 
issue.  There is also a serious issue with municipalities sharing pertinent information with the 
citizenry.  There are constant discussions between the central and local governments on the level 
of funding and revenue-raising authority for specific services, like education, so there is no 
“scientific” truth regarding this issue. However, given the increasing responsibilities of 
Macedonian municipalities, their budgets expressed as shares of GDP are still relatively small.  
He also feels that, on the whole, the municipalities have sufficient freedom to form their budgets 
and to execute them as they see fit. 
Anonymous individual, employed by an international development consulting firm 
 
According to this informant, Macedonia has adopted a complete decentralized education system.  
As such, based on the reform approved by the government, the impression from the outside may 
be that the municipalities are ready to execute their responsibilities.  However, the reform did not 
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prepare the municipalities with the necessary technical skills and training to execute their duties.  
One of the major issues regarding the functioning of municipalities is the lack of clarification of 
the legal competencies among all stakeholders.  
 
Based on the informant’s experience working with municipalities in Macedonia during the first 
phase of decentralization, the major issues identified were that local governments did not have 
the right staff, or the staff was not trained with the right skills to execute the new responsibilities. 
The needs that were identified were: prioritization of investment needs of the school system, 
division of the responsibilities among school directors and the municipality education staff, and 
providing quality advice in improving management capacity and skills of local governments to 
better manage their new responsibilities.  Even though the transfer of competencies to local 
governments has been a significant and important step, without the adequate resources necessary 
to perform the tasks assigned to the municipalities, decentralization may fail.  
 
In general, Macedonia has made positive progress during the first phase of decentralization.  The 
second phase will impose a large burden for the municipalities if the central government does not 
provide clear guidance to them and also if does not provide the support they need.   
 
 
Islam Yusufi, European Agency for Reconstruction 
 
 
In Mr. Yusufi’s opinion, the current legislative framework of decentralization, in principle, 
provides for sound functioning of the municipalities.  All responsibilities set in the new 
legislative framework have been transferred to the municipalities, with the exception of the 
management of state owned land. However, as can be expected when taking power away from 
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one entity and transferring it to another, the central government has shown some resistance to 
transfer some responsibilities.  He feels that the overall political commitment to decentralization 
of the citizens and the international community has mitigated such actions.  In principle, the 
municipalities are free to act independently of any central government ministries and officials.  
However, regarding economic development, the municipalities require the right to manage the 
state owned land within their jurisdiction, which creates a problem because the central 
government still has the right to manage that state owned land.  This creates difficulties in 
implementing development plans. 
 
In the areas where the responsibility has been given to municipalities, they are able to act without 
interference from the central government. However, it often happens that line ministries take 
away some of the rights given to municipalities, such as the case when the Minister of Education 
took away the rights of some municipalities to appoint school directors. Fortunately, 
municipalities can appeal such actions to the government inter-ministerial committees. 
 
Mr. Yusufi believes that the municipalities are deficient in both the number and quality of staff 
to allow them to perform the duties assigned to them. Nevertheless, the central government has 
transferred the staff from the central government and/or field offices to the municipalities as 
outlined in the legislation.  There are training opportunities offered to the municipalities by the 
government and by international donor agencies, such as the European Union. In terms of 
municipalities being equipped with the technology and resources to perform the functions 
prescribed to them, Mr. Yusufi feels that the urban municipalities possess the needed technology 
and resources while the smaller and more rural ones do not. 
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Regarding the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the areas of decentralization, equitable 
representation, and language use have been the most successfully implemented.  The government 
has also sought assistance from the international community as outlined in the framework. 
 
Mr. Yusufi believes that the 2004 Law on Territorial Organization of Local Self Governments 
has in principle achieved the goal of creating the optimal number of municipalities that are of 
adequate size.  This fact is reflected in the 50 or so municipalities that have already been able to 
transition to the second phase of the decentralization process, which provides for more funding 
from the central to local government.   He also sees success in inter-municipal cooperation due to 
the legislation governing this area, and forms of it have proven to be successful in various cases. 
 
Mr. Yusufi believes that, generally speaking, the municipalities have the necessary revenue-
raising authority to sufficiently fund the devolved activities under the relevant legislation due 
largely to their ability to collect revenue from property taxes and share with central government 
the Personal Income Tax and the Value Added Tax. Whether or not they are entirely sufficient 
depends on the level of taxes collected in each individual municipality. 
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Recommendations
The findings of this research lead this author to conclude that Macedonia has made significant 
progress in the decentralization process.  Overall, the relevant responsibilities have been 
transferred to the local municipalities as prescribed in the laws pertaining to decentralization 
over the past sixteen years.  Although each law passed has not been without flaws, the system 
currently in place provides a sound legal framework that clearly outlines the municipalities’ 
responsibilities and has significantly strengthened the role the municipalities play in the lives of 
the citizens.  This has created a structure of governance that is far more decentralized than any 
previous arrangement in the country’s history and has helped Macedonia make significant 
progress towards creating better local democracy.  However, despite the fact that municipalities 
have considerable more authority and financial autonomy, the municipalities face several hurdles 
in becoming sustainable entities with independent authority over all of their responsibilities. 
 
Outcomes of the Decentralization Process 
The drafting of the 1991 Constitution was a landmark event that established local self-
government as one of the fundamental values of the Republic of Macedonia.  It guaranteed the 
right of local self-government and defined the municipalities as local self-government units in 
which communal self-government could be organized.  The constitution granted municipalities 
limited power and gave them responsibility for a limited number of competencies, as well as 
limited financial autonomy.  Although the constitution granted only a limited number of 
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responsibilities to the municipalities and did not make substantial progress in terms of financing 
for them, it nevertheless proved to provide a good foundation from which to create a more 
decentralized form of governance.   
 
The Local Government Act of 1995 marked a significant increase in the financial autonomy of 
the municipalities by transferring revenue-raising authority to them.  This act expanded the 
revenue sources for the local governments and allowed them access to a variety of revenue 
sources that were previously reserved for the central government.  However, the law created a 
number of grants that the municipalities became heavily dependant on.  This resulted in a limited 
amount of financial autonomy for the municipalities that is a fundamental component of any 
decentralization system that seeks to allow them to execute the decentralized functions 
effectively.    
 
The Law on Territorial Division, which followed the Local Government Act, increased the 
number of municipalities from 34 to 123.  This was seen as a way to create smaller units of local 
government that would allow for common interests to be more easily identified in order to solve 
problems.  This was to increase the responsiveness of local governments by bringing government 
closer to the citizens.  This did not happen since the law ultimately created too many 
municipalities that were too small in size and lacked the financial capacity to effectively handle 
the responsibilities transferred to them and manage the interests and problems of the citizenry.  
 
The Local Self-Government Act of 2002 ushered in a whole new era of decentralization and 
marked a significant improvement in the functioning of the municipalities.  The act shifted many 
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competencies to the local municipalities and guaranteed them as primarily the responsibility of 
the municipalities.  The law made the competency to perform activities of local importance as 
comprehensive and exclusive, which allowed them to regulate and perform these activities 
independently of the central government.  The law granted municipalities the right to establish 
local policy and departments according to local needs without influence from the central 
government.   The only control of the central government is in its ability to supervise the legality 
of the operations of the municipalities but not on the substantive action of the local authorities.  
With this law, the municipalities became far more responsible for carrying out the functions that 
are normally associated with local governments and gained political, financial, and policy 
independence.  Another positive change that occurred was the ability for municipalities to set up 
associations in order to protect and promote shared interests, such as the Association of Local 
Self-Government Units (ZELS), as a counterbalance to the central government.  Inter-municipal 
cooperation is a key component of any decentralization program as it strengthens the position of 
the municipalities and provides opportunities to collaborate and share in the delivery of services 
when needed.  While the Law on Self-government drafted in January 2002 precipitated several 
changes in the fiscal power of the municipalities, it did not go far enough in providing the 
municipalities with adequate financial autonomy.   
   
The Law on Territorial Organization of Local Self-Government of 2004 decreased the number of 
municipalities to 85.  This was to create municipalities of a larger size in order to ensure they 
have sufficient capacity to raise their own revenue and provide municipal services more 
efficiently and effectively.  This law succeeded in creating municipalities that were larger in both 
size and population, but the fact remains that there is still a significant percentage of 
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municipalities that have small populations and weak economic bases that they are not able to 
generate the revenue needed to adequately perform the duties assigned to them.   
 
The Law on Financing the Units of Local Self-Government of 2004 addressed the shortcomings 
of the 2002 law regarding the financial autonomy of the municipalities.  This new law 
established a new local public financing system that enabled a higher level of financial 
independence than any other system before it.  This law achieved one of the cornerstones of a 
decentralized system by balancing the sources of financing with the actual needs of the 
municipalities.  An important component of this law was granting municipalities the ability to 
collect revenues from a larger number of sources and allowing them to define the level of tax 
rates and the level of charges and fees for their own source revenues.  By increasing the sources 
of revenue for the municipalities and allowing them to utilize these revenues according to their 
own needs independent of the central government, Macedonia came closer achieving a truly 
decentralized form of government with substantial political, economic, and policy authority for 
the municipalities.   
 
That said, there are still a number of issues that the reforms have yet to fully address.  The most 
significant issue Macedonia faces regarding decentralization is the inadequacy of financial 
resources available to the municipalities.  There are still a number of municipalities that still lack 
the financial resources to handle the newly acquired competencies.  Autonomous financial 
responsibility is at the core of the concept of decentralization.  Without the necessary financial 
resources, these municipalities will not be able to govern effectively and provide the public 
services they are responsible for.  This is a major hurdle for reform in Macedonia, as local policy 
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makers and officials are unable to make effective decisions without the necessary financial 
resources.  One example of how municipalities fail in generating sufficient revenue is the 
underperformance of the revenue raised from the property tax.  Because of administration 
difficulties and the structure of the system (as in low rates), in 2006, revenues from the property 
tax represented only 2.7 percent of the municipalities’ total budget or 0.06 percent of GDP.  The 
average percent of GDP collected in developing and transitional countries from the property tax 
is about ten times what is currently collected in Macedonia.  There is great potential for this tax 
to become a much more important source of municipal revenues.   
 
There are also serious shortages in many municipalities of properly trained staff that lack the 
professional skills to effectively execute the functions of local government assigned to them.  
While the central government has successfully transferred the staff to the local municipalities, as 
was required in the legislation, there simply was not enough staff in the central government to 
adequately staff the new offices created in the municipalities.  The municipalities still do not 
have the needed number of staff to handle the new responsibilities.  There are also cases where 
municipalities have the needed number of staff, but the staff does not have the technical and 
professional skills to perform the functions of the local office.  While there has been an effort on 
the part of the government of Macedonia and the international community to provide training for 
staff development, it has not been sufficient to address the lack of capacity of the municipalities.       
 
Recommendations 
In order to address the inability of municipalities to generate sufficient revenue, it is 
recommended that the municipalities’ share of total public resources is increased in stages to 
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reach levels comparable with those found in other European countries of similar size 
(approximately 16 percent corresponding to 8 percent of the GDP).  The financial autonomy of 
the municipalities would be strengthened by increasing the actual share of local taxes (or the 
municipalities’ share of value added tax and personal income tax) and at the same time reduce 
state subsidies.  This would assist the municipalities in achieving financial independence.  Along 
those same lines is the recommendation that Macedonia adopt the principle of concomitant 
financing, which ensures that all transfers of responsibilities to local authorities are accompanied 
by the transfer of resources equal to those which central government allocated to the activities in 
question. 
 
In order to address the shortage of properly trained and skilled staff in the municipalities, it is 
essential that the skills and professionalism of municipal staff be strengthened.  It is crucial that 
there be genuine expertise in local management and inculcating a new culture whereby questions 
are addressed from the perspective of public efficiency and quality of service to the public.  
Therefore, there must be increased efforts to provide vocational training for local government 
employees and improve their technical abilities.  The many initiatives underway in this area must 
be properly coordinated among all relevant stakeholders and expanded.  It is recommended that 
in order for the municipalities to make full use of the powers transferred to them, they must 
strive to strengthen their administrative services and recruitment of qualified staff, especially 
specialists in town-planning law, education, and financial administrators.
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Primary Lessons Learned 
 
A number of lessons can be drawn from Macedonia’s decentralization process that can be 
applied to other countries’ efforts to decentralize.   
 
1. The decentralization process is an ongoing process that is continuously evolving.  
Policymakers must address the realities of instituting such large-scale reforms and factor 
in the time involved and the ability to continually examine the effectiveness of the 
program.  The political reality that exists when the process begins might be drastically 
different ten or fifteen years later.  Additionally, it is not reasonable to assume that 
granting local units of government more authority will result in stronger units overnight 
that are able to perform the functions devolved to them.  With this in mind, policymakers 
and others involved in the process, including the public, must be realistic and patient with 
the slow and, at times, painful transition to establishing local units of government that are 
more effective, efficient, and accountable.   
2. Decentralization should not be used as a tool to achieve purely political objectives.  Such 
behavior can lead to short-sighted solutions to long-term problems that can be detrimental 
to the process.  Often such action stems from certain interests in the government and 
political system to capitalize on the frustrations of their constituents for their own 
personal or political gain.  Not only does this distract from the other objectives of 
decentralization, but can lead to discontent among the population that threatens the 
success of not only the decentralization process, but the long-term political stability of the 
country.  In Macedonia, the only time that the decentralization process suffered from a 
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strong lack of public support was following the 2001 conflict when heavy-handed 
reforms, although reasonable to many observes familiar with decentralization, were 
quickly pushed through.  These reforms were seen by some Macedonians an attempt to 
use decentralization as a way to strip power away from Macedonians in favor of ethnic 
Albanians.  Whether or not that was the case is beyond the scope of this study, but it does 
illustrate how, if peoples’ suspicions were true, using decentralization as an instrument to 
achieve political objectives can potentially derail the reform process, and ultimately 
threaten the political future of a country. 
3. Macedonia’s success in clearly defining the rights and responsibilities of the local units 
of government is an example of how the legislative framework ought to be.  Although 
early laws pertaining to decentralization fell short of achieving the kind of results that a 
sound decentralization reform process seeks, the Macedonian government was able to 
learn from the lessons of those early attempts and draft clearer and more sound legislation 
that increased the municipalities’ ability to govern more effectively.  The Macedonian 
government displayed maturity and prudence in not rushing through the process and 
drafting legislation that did not clearly define the responsibilities of the municipalities. 
4. Macedonia’s decentralization process has not been without its shortcomings.  The most 
significant failure has been the lack of municipal capacity in certain areas, primarily due 
to deficiencies in financial authority and human resources.  It was not until 15 years into 
the process that the financial capacity of the municipalities was adequately addressed, 
and even then there are still problems with municipalities not being financially 
independent.  This can be attributed to the government not taking into the financial 
capacity of the municipalities and transferring responsibilities to them without the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  104
necessary revenue sources to handle them.  It is therefore imperative that the highest 
quality sources of revenue be made available to the local units of government.  Another 
issue regarding financial authority is the fact that there are municipalities that, due to 
certain geographic and economic realities, will always lack the ability to generate the 
revenue needed to effectively provide certain public services.  The same logic applies to 
the lack of qualified staff in many municipalities that hinders the municipalities’ ability to 
perform the responsibilities transferred to them.  Several of the areas of public 
administration and service delivery suffer from the problem of underperformance due 
deficiencies in the quality and quantity of properly trained staff.   Ample opportunities for 
training and professional development must be made available to the municipalities to 
ensure such problems do not exist.        
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  105
Bibliography
 
Anonymous, unnamed international development organization.  Interview by author 2 June 2008,  
Cincinnati.  Internet correspondence. 
 
Channel Research. 2007.  Decentralization Policy Needs Assessment.  www.channelreseach.org.   
Accessed 22 June 2008. 
 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. 2007.  Draft Recommendation 217 (2007) Local  
Democracy in “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.  Strasbourg:  Council of 
Europe. 
 
Dunn, W.N.  1975.  “Communal Federalism:  Dialectics of Decentralization in Socialist  
Yugoslavia.”  Publius: Federalism and Community:  A Comparative View.  Volume 5, 
No. 2.  127-150. 
 
Eaton, Kent.  2004.  “Risky Business:  Decentralization from above in Chile and Uruguay.”   
Comparative Politics, Volume 37, No. 1,  1-22. 
 
Feruglio, Nicoletta, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Andrey Timofeev.  2007.  Fiscal  
Decentralization in Macedonia:  An Assessment.  United Nations Development Program. 
 
Grochowski, Miroslaw.  2001.  Managing Urban Development in the Context of Public  
Administration Reform:  The Case of Eastern Europe.  International Journal of Public 
Administration.  Vol. 24, issue 2,  143-161. 
 
Herczynski, Jan, Warsaw University.  Interview by author 29 June 2008, Cincinnati.  Internet  
correspondence. 
 
Horvath, Tamas M. (Ed.). 2000. Decentralization:  Experiments and Reforms.  Budapest:  Local  
Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute. 
 
Institute for Regional and International Studies. 2006. The Process of Decentralization in  
Macedonia:  Prospects for Ethnic Conflict Mitigation, Enhanced Representation, 
Institutional Efficiency and Accountability.  Sofia, Bulgaria:  Institute for Regional and 
International Studies.  
 
International Labour Organization.  2001. The Impact of Decentralization and Privatization on
Municipal Services.  Geneva:  International Labour Office. 
 
Kolodko, Grzeorz W. 2000. From Shock to Therapy:  The Political Economy of Post socialist
Transformation.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Kymlicka, Will. 2001.  Politics in the Vernacular:  Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and
Citizenship  Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  106
 
Lang, Nicholas R.  1975.  “The Dialectics of Decentralization:  Economic Reform and Regional  
Inequality in Yugoslavia.”  World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3.  309-335. 
 
Lapidoth, Ruth. 1997.  Autonomy:  Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts.  Washington, D.C.:   
United States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Ohrid Framework Agreement.  2001.  Skopje: Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 
 
Rafuse, Robert W.  2000.  Why Fiscal Decentralization in Macedonia?  Skopje:  USAID. 
 
Ramet, Sabrina   2005.  The Three Yugoslavias:  State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005.   
Bloomington:  Indiana University Press.   
 
Rodden, Jonathan.  2004.  “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization:  On Meaning and  
Measurement.”  Comparative Politics.  Volume 36, No. 4,  481-500. 
 
Rondinelli, Dennis A., John R. Nellis, and G.Shabbir Cheema. 1984.  Decentralization in  
Developing Countries:  A Review of Recent Experience.  Washington, D.C.:  World 
Bank. 
 
Rosenbloom, David H.  1998  Public Administration:  Understanding Management, Politics, and
Lawin the Public Sector.  New York:  McGraw-Hill.. 
 
Sharma, Chanchal Kumar.  2006.  “Decentralization Dilemma:  Measuring the Degree and  
Evaluating the Outcomes.”  Indian Journal of Political Science.  Volume 67, No. 1, 49-
64. 
 
Shin, Roy W. and Alfred Tat-Kei Ho. 1998.  “Strategies for Economic Development Under  
Decentralization:  A Transformation of the Political Economy.”  Handbook of Economic 
Development.  Ed. Kuotsai Tom Liou.  Orlando:  University of Central Florida. 
 
Steunenberg, Bernard and Nico Mol. 1997. “Fiscal and Financial Decentralization:  a  
Comparative Analysis of Six West European Countries.”  Public Sector Reform:
Rationale, Trends, and Problems.  Ed. Jan-Erik Lane.  Thousnd Oaks:  Sage Publications.   
 
Todorovski, Ilija. 2001. “Local Government in Macedonia.”  Stabilization of Local  
Governments.  Ed. Emilia Kandeva.  Budapest:  Local Government and Public Service 
Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute.   
 
Trogen, Paul C. 2001.  “Devolution or Dissolution:  Decentralization in the Former Soviet  
Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Russian Federation.”  Handbook of 
Comparative and Development Public Administration.  Ed. Ali Farazmand.  Ft. 
Lauderdale:  Florida Atlantic University. 
 
Vujacic, Ilija G. 2002.  “The Challenges of Ethnic Federalism:  Experiences and Lessons of the  
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  107
Former Yugoslavia.”  Federalism and Decentralization:  Perspectives for the 
Transformation Process in Eastern and Central Europe.  Eds. Rose, Jurgen and Johannes 
Ch. Traut.  New York:  Palgrave. 
 
United Nations Development Program.  2005.  Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies:   
Case Studies from the Balkans and Caucasus.  Bratislava:  United Nations Development 
Program. 
 
United Nations Development Program. 2004.  National Human Development Report 2004  
F.Y.R. Macedonia:  Decentralization for Human Development.  Skopje, Macedonia:  
United Nations Development Program. 
 
United States Agency for International Development.  2005.  Macedonia Local Government  
Reform Project Final Report. Skopje. United States Agency for International 
Development. 
 
United States Agency for International Development-Macedonia website.  October 28, 2006.   
Website: http://macedonia.usaid.gov/.  Access 12 February 2007. 
 
Yusufi, Islam, European Agency for Reconstruction.  Interview by author, 12 July 2008,  
Cincinnati.  Internet correspondence. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  108
Appendix
Each informant was asked the same series of questions: 
 
1. To what extent does the current system allow for the municipalities to fully execute the 
responsibilities granted to them under the Constitution and subsequent laws? 
 
 
2. To what degree has the central government transferred the responsibilities to the 
municipalities, as outlined in the legislation that pertains to local self-government? 
 
 
a. Is there resistance on the part of central government authorities and politicians to 
transfer responsibilities to the municipalities as envisioned in the Constitution and 
subsequent laws? 
 
 
i. If so, what system is in place to mitigate such actions?  
 
 
3. To what degree are the municipalities free from central government ministries and 
officials to: 
 
 
b. design the policies of each office in its respective area, and  
 
 
c. execute them appropriately? 
 
 
4. If any, what systems are in place to allow municipalities and locally elected officials to 
function without interference from the central government? 
 
 
5. Does the central government perform the duties prescribed to it in the legislation, for 
example do the central government authorities review and approve plans set forth by the 
local governments in a timely and fair manner? 
 
 
6. Do the municipalities have the necessary staff to perform the duties that have been 
transferred to them? 
 
 
d. Has there been a transfer of staff from the central government and/or field offices to 
the municipalities as prescribed in the legislation? 
                                                                                                                                                                         
             
  109
 
 
7. Do the local officials have the managerial and technical skills needed to take over 
functions previously held by the central government? 
 
 
e. If not, are there opportunities and funding available to properly train them? 
 
 
8. Do the municipalities have the technology and resources (not financial) needed to 
perform the functions associated with the new responsibilities? 
 
 
9. Regarding decentralization, has the Ohrid Framework Agreement been followed as 
intended? 
 
f. In what areas has the OFA been implemented successfully? 
 
g. Has the Macedonian government adequately sought assistance from the international 
community in implementing the OFA?  
 
10.  The Law on Territorial Organization of Local Self Governments was intended to create 
the optimal number of municipalities that are of adequate size. 
 
 
h. Do you feel that the law achieved that goal? 
 
 
i. Are the municipalities of appropriate size to efficiently provide basic municipal 
services? 
 
i. If yes, how many/which ones? 
 
 
j. Is there a problem with assigning a single scope of functions to all municipalities that 
risks substandard provision of functions in some localities while failing to utilize 
capacity existing in others? 
 
 
i. If yes, are there any (or adequate) opportunities for inter-municipal 
cooperation to mitigate this issue? 
 
 
11. How much is pertinent information being shared between the central government and 
municipalities? 
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k. How much is pertinent information being shared between the municipalities and the 
citizenry?  
 
 
12. Do the municipalities have the necessary revenue-raising authority to sufficiently fund 
the devolved activities under the relevant legislation? 
 
 
13. Is the scope of local government discretion in expenditures sufficient in terms of their 
expenditure needs? 
 
 
 
Additional information/opinions: 
 
